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THE NEED FOR SPECIAL CLOSE CORPORATION
LEGISLATION IN ILLINOIS
Robert E. Ginsberg*
In this Article, Professor Ginsberg makes a plea to the Illinois
legislature to enact comprehensive legislation to govern close
-corporations. The author attempts to define and analyze the
major conceptual changes necessary for the enactment of such
legislation and contends that partnership law should be inte-
grated with corporation law in the formulation of a close corpo-
ration statute. In suggesting possible provisions in the areas of
definition, control and dissolution, the author offers a critique
of relevant portions of the proposed Illinois Close Corporation
Act of 1975.
I. INTRODUCTION
About ten years ago the Supreme Court of Illinois in Galler v.
Galler acknowledged the "definite, albeit inarticulate trend to-
ward eventual judicial treatment of the close corporation as sui
generis."' Observing that "several shareholder-agreements that
have technically 'violated' the letter of the Business Corporation
Act have nevertheless been upheld in light of the existing practi-
cal circumstances," 2 the court concluded that
[t]he practical result of this [trend], while liberally giving
legal efficacy to particular agreements in special circumstances
notwithstanding literal "violations" of statutory corporate law,
has been to inject much doubt and uncertainty into the thinking
of the bench and corporate bar of Illinois ....
It was suggested in passing that perhaps ". . . a separate compre-
hensive statutory scheme governing the close corporation would
best serve here. .. .
In the decade which has passed since the supreme court's
suggestion, several states have adopted the idea of a separate
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A., Brown University; J.D., Ameri-
can University Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
1. 32 Ill. 2d 16, 28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1965).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 30, 203 N.E.2d at 585.
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comprehensive statutory scheme governing the close corporation.'
Others have opted for a more limited approach of adding or
amending particular sections of their existing business corpora-
tion law to solve at least some of the problems peculiar to close
corporations.' Illinois has followed neither of these routes. It has
done nothing. As a result, the doubt and uncertainty for close
corporation planners pointed out by the court in Galler remain.'
A single comprehensive statutory scheme, the Illinois Business
Corporation Act, governs all Illinois corporations.' No legislative
recognition is given to the possibility that the problems of a cor-
poration with a large number of widely scattered stockholders
might be different than those of a corporation with few investors.
Yet to suggest that the needs of the owners and managers of a
close corporation are identical with those of a public corporation
in areas such as protection of minority rights and management
control devices is to refuse to recognize realities. While a holder
of thirty-two percent of the common stock of a public business is
probably in control of that business," a holder of a similar per-
centage of the stock of a closely-held business, absent specific
control devices, may well have no control power whatsoever.'"
Most stockholders in public businesses are investors and specu-
5. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7201-16
(Supp. 1972); MD. CORP. & Ass'N CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 1371-86 (Supp. 1975); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1 to -5 (Supp. 1975).
The Florida close corporation statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-77 (Supp. 1975), was
enacted in 1963, before the Galler decision and was mentioned by the court. 32 111. 2d at
30-31, 203 N.E.2d at 585. All of the others were enacted in the decade after Galler.
6. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 701 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-
51 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 16.22 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.32 (1965).
Some of these, such as the Wyoming statute, were in existence at the time of the Galler
decision. The court in Galler did refer to two other existing statutory provisions which
dealt specifically with the problems peculiar to close corporations. They are N.Y. Bus.
CORP. ACT § 620 (McKinney 1963) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1975). 32 Ill. 2d at 30-31,
203 N.E.2d 585. See also Special Comment-Close Corporation, 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. 756-59 (2d ed. 1971).
7. For a good example of the failure of the ad hoc judicical approach to solving the
problems of the close corporation as opposed to a comprehensive legislative approach, see
Somers v. AAA Temp. Serv., Inc., 5 I1. App. 3d 931, 284 N.E.2d 462 (1st Dist. 1972).
8. ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.32, §§ 157.1 et seq. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as IBCA].
9. See generally W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 229-50 (4th ed. 1969).
10. F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
'SQUEEZE-OUTS' IN SMALL ENTERPRISES 5-6 (1961).
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lators seeking income from or appreciation of invested capital."
For such investors free transferability of shares is a necessity and
any restrictions on transfer detract seriously from the value of the
investment.'" On the other hand, investors in a closely-held busi-
ness are usually actively involved in the affairs of the business
and are therefore concerned about the identity of their fellow
investors who are likely to have a substantial impact on the suc-
cess or failure of the enterprise.'3 To a shareholder in such a
business, a restriction on transfer of shares, which enables each
of the investors to exercise control over any change in the identity
of his fellow owners, adds to rather than detracts from the value
of those shares. These are but two examples of the many essential
differences between close and public corporations-differences
which have long been recognized by everyone except the state
legislatures."
Illinois was at one time a leader in the area of business corpora-
tion legislation. When the American Bar Association sought to
draft a Model Business Corporation Act in the late 1940's, it
turned to the Illinois Business Corporation Act (IBCA) of 1933 for
a base on which to build.'5 In the ensuing years, other states have
modernized their business corporation laws to give greater flexi-
bility to business planners and to facilitate the desire of owners
of closely-held businesses for an incorporated partnership, com-
bining the favorable attributes of the partnership, such as selec-
tion of associates, flexibility of management structure, and a
minimum of ceremony, with the best attributes of the corpora-
tion, particularly limited liability and continuity. During this
period the unchanged IBCA has become archaic,'" especially in
11. 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION § 1.07, at 21 (1971).
12. Securities subject to restrictions on transfer because they have not been registered
under section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (1970), sell in a private
placement for a price substantially lower than the identical security which is freely traded.
Cf. E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 60 (1965).
13. See note 11, supra.
14. See Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L.
REV. 104 (1888). See also Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27
MICH. L. REV. 273 (1929).
15. 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 1, 2, at 3 (2d ed. 1971).
16. It should be noted that some of the inflexibility was attributable to the constitu-
tional requirements of cumulative voting and prohibition against non-voting shares. See
ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1870); Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
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the context of the close corporation. 7 Since the vast majority of
business corporations being formed and in existence today are
small, close corporations," their problems should be of primary
concern to the legislature.
Since the peculiar problems of doubt and uncertainty in plan-
ning for the close coporation have been acknowledged and clearly
identified by the courts for more than ten years, the Illinois legis-
lature should resolve them by establishing a special statutory
scheme for close corporations. Yet, to date, the Illinois legislature
has done virtually nothing."9 The most recent rejection of a close
corporation act for Illinois,2" occurring just this year, indicates
their continued reluctance to facilitate close corporation plan-
ning. One probable reason for this reluctance is that the only
advocates of reform are legal scholars.'
However, these restrictions have been removed from the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and
the legislature now has full freedom to amend the IBCA. See ILL. CONST. art. XIII § 6.
See also ILL. CONST. art. XIII, §6 (Smith-Hurd 1970) (commenting on the effect of the
constitutional amendment).
17. Illinois is the only state which still prohibits non-voting stock. IBCA §14; 1 MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 15, 3.03, at 361 (2d ed. 1971). It is also one of only two states, the
other being Mississippi, that expressly prohibits directors from filling a vacancy on the
board of directors. IBCA § 36; 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 38, 3.02, at 801 (2d ed.
1971).
18. While there are no available statistics indicating what percentage of the corpora-
tions which exist in this country are close corporations, there are studies which suggest
that the overwhelming majority are close corporations. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, § 1.02,
at 5 n. 8. See also Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question of Eco-
nomic Validity, 14 How. L.J. 241, 253-56 (1968).
19. While several proposed close corporation statutes have been introduced in the legis-
lature, none has been adopted to date. See, e.g., H.B. 1950, 79th Il. Gen. Assembly (1975)
(Introduced April 12, 1975). H.B. 1193, 78th Il. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced April
12, 1973). The 1973 proposed act died in committee. The 1975 proposed act passed the
House but died in the Senate.
20. PROPOSED AC, H.B. 1950, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1975). [hereinafter cited as
PROPOSED Ac-]. Relevant sections of the Proposed Act have been reproduced in the
appendix to this Article.
21. The legal literature advocating the passage of close corporation statutes has been
voluminous. See, e.g., Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland
Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525; Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close
Corporation - The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1966);
Ham, Suggestions for Modernizing the Kentucky General Corporation Law to Meet the
Needs of Close Corporations, 52 Ky. L.J. 527 (1964); Wolens, A Round Peg-A Square
Hole: The Close Corporation and the Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 811 (1968); Note, Some Specific
Needs of the Close Corporation Not Met Under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act:
Suggestions for Statutory Relief, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1008 (1970); Note, Missouri
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Owners of close corporations are not concerned with how to
change the law starting tomorrow. They want to form a corpora-
tion today and have neither the time, the resources, nor the in-
centive to seek a prospective change in the law. The primary ob-
jective of the owners is to enter into a corporate form allowing
them certain liability and tax advantages, and which at the same
time will be tailored to meet their needs with a minimum of
formality, inconvenience, expense and risk. What they are really
seeking is an incorporated partnership, and they want it today."2
If the present law suggests they cannot enter into the type of
arrangement which will best meet their needs, they do not go to
Springfield for a solution. They simply try to find a way to cir-
cumvent the law or enter into an alternative arrangement.
Since certain problems peculiar to public corporations recur in
repeated transactions such as mergers, recapitalizations, forma-
tion and dissolution of subsidiaries, the allocation of resources for
active participation in a statutory reform effort is justified in
order to alleviate the problem prospectively.23 The owners of close
corporations, however, have only occasional contact with the Bus-
iness Corporation Act. Incorporation, merger and recapitalization
are truly extraordinary transactions to such businesses. Because
these owners are much more concerned with opening the doors of
their business and keeping them open, they attach a low priority
to allocating resources for legislative reform. As a result, there is
no lobby for close corporation statutes.
A variety of additional factors have contributed to the reluc-
tance of the legislature to free the close corporation from the
strictures of traditional corporate norms. Historically, the legis-
Corporation Statutes- Needed Changes for Close Corporations, 38 Mo. L. REV. 460
(1973); Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33
N.Y.U.L. REv. 700 (1958); Note, The Need for Legislative Recognition of Utah's Close
Corporation, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 270.
22. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 435, 439-40 (1953).
23. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close
Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 2. The adoption of short-form merger statutes, simplify-
ing mergers of parents and subsidiaries, by some twenty states in the past fifteen years is
a good example of the type of reform made principally for the benefit of larger, public
businesses. Compare 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 68A, 6, at 349 (1960) with 2 MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 75, 6, at 391 (2d ed. 1971) and MODEL Bus. CORP. Aer ANN. § 75
6, at 349-50 (Supp. 1973).
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lature has sought to protect several interests in a business cor-
poration act. Probably, the most important of these are the rights
of creditors and of minority, non-management shareholders.
The Illinois Proposed Act for Close Corporations, as well as the
ideas to be developed subsequently in this Article, in no way
weaken the protections presently afforded under the IBCA. 4 A
basic rule of corporate law, that the shareholders' interests must
be subordinated to those of the creditors, is unaffected by the
Proposed Act. Regardless of whether the close corporation is man-
aged by a board of directors or by the shareholders directly, 5 the
corporation can only make distributions to its shareholders in the
form of dividends or return of capital when it meets certain finan-
cial standards."
In practice, the Proposed Act strengthens the protections avail-
able under the IBCA. If the owners of a close corporation choose
to manage the business directly without a board of directors, they
acquire the statutory liabilities placed on the directors and con-
senting shareholders for improper distributions under the IBCA.27
Presumably there will be more shareholders than directors and
therefore, the creditors will have more pockets to look to, includ-
ing those of innocent non-management shareholders. Their shield
of limited liability is thus somewhat less effective than it would
be under the present act.28 In addition, the traditional practice of
close corporation creditors to bargain for the personal guarantee
of some or all of the shareholders before extending the corporation
credit is not altered.
24. See PROPOSED AcT § 2(b).
25. PROPOSED AcT §12, permits the close corporation to be managed by shareholders in
lieu of directors.
26. Id. §2(b), makes it clear that existing solvency and surplus requirements for the
payment of dividends, IBCA §41, the repurchase of shares, id. §6, or any other distribution
of capital to the shareholders, id. §41 (a), remain applicable to close corporations.
27. IBCA § 42.1-.11. Creditors also continue to have other rights, such as the power to
seek and compel liquidation in the event of insolvency. See id. § 86 (b).
28. PROPOSED AcT §12 (a)(2). There is no limitation in the Proposed Act making only
active shareholders liable. Thus both management and non-management shareholders are
liable for improper dividends and distributions. Non-management shareholders could
escape liability by registering their dissent and declining the profferred payments. IBCA
§42.9. However, such a scenario is unrealistic in all except the most extraordinary cases.
All shareholders would still have limited liability as to tort and contract creditors as long
as no improper distribution has in fact been made.
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The Proposed Act would also adequately protect the interests
of voluntary and involuntary minority shareholders. The princi-
pal thesis to be advanced by this Article is that the thrust of a
close corporation statute should be to grant the owners of the
business the broadest possible flexibility in arranging how and
pursuant to what terms the corporate interests are to be allocated
and corporate central powers to be distributed. It has been sug-
gested by one of the leading authorities on close corporations,
Professor O'Neal, that the state provide, "self-executory protec-
tion for minority shareholders who have failed to bargain for
special charter or by-law provisions or for protective clauses in
shareholders' agreements."29 There is presently no provision in
the IBCA which implements this suggestion. Furthermore, the
courts' general application of the business judgment rule under
the present law has had the effect of shielding the board of direc-
tors, the representatives of the minority interests, from attack by
the minority in all but the most egregious cases."
In discussing the protection of minority shareholders in the
close corporation, a distinction must be made between voluntar-
ily and involuntarily acquired interests. In the first situation, the
investor, commonly known as the venture capitalist, is presuma-
bly a mature, reasonably sophisticated adult who does not need
the state's assistance in the bargaining process. On the other
hand, the involuntary shareholder, such as an heir or a personal
creditor of a voluntary shareholder upon execution is apt to have
interests which are different from his or her predecessor and is
likely to lack the power to protect them. The IBCA affords the
involuntary shareholder little protection unless the predecessor
was powerful enough in the negotiating process to extract statu-
torily permissible devices for protection and control." Provisions
29. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §1.14(c), at 74.
30. Id. at 75-76; Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 i1. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1st Dist.
1968).
31. IBCA §146. See generally Articles cited in note 38 infra, for a wide variety of devices
a powerful predecessor could create to afford protection to an involuntary successor.
However, the concern with minority shareholders has not centered on the problems of
those whose predecessors took advantage of such devices, but on those who did not. The
relevant question is, as viewed by Professor O'Neal, whether the state should afford those
shareholders mandatory, not bargained for, protections against the majority. See 1 F.
O'NEAL, supra note 11, §1.14(c), at 77.
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for involuntary liquidation at the behest of a minority share-
holder in cases of oppression are a cumbersome, expensive and
often impractical solution.32 The Proposed Act and the sugges-
tions to be developed subsequently in the section on dissension
and deadlock at least permit the parties full freedom to plan for
future contingencies, such as the death of a shareholder." The
question of whether the state should go further and afford such
rights on a mandatory basis to involuntary shareholders is a de-
batable one.34 However, it is more desirable to allow the owners
of the close corporation to provide for protections of involuntary
shareholders as they prefer, rather than enforce a uniform rule
which may be detrimental in certain cases. 5 The parties are in
a better position than the state to determine the treatment of
potential heirs and others who could succeed to the shares by
operation of law.
Another factor weighing against special treatment for close cor-
porations appears to be the belief that this treatment will prevent
businesses from gradually evolving into public corporations.38 If,
in fact, it is desirable that close corporations gradually transform
themselves into public corporations, a notion which would appear
likely to trouble the nation's securities regulators, then it is true
that the Proposed Act and other close corporation statutes are
undesirable in that they tend to inhibit the process. However, it
should be noted that these acts do not absolutely prevent a close
corporation from becoming public. They only require that the
transformation be effected by the shareholders pursuant to an
orderly decision-making process. The owners would have to elect
to forego the special treatment afforded close corporations and
32. IBCA §86. See note 168 and accompanying text infra.
33. See generally notes 163-89 and accompanying text infra. Provisions such as those
allowing the parties to permit any shareholder to compel dissolution by contract and
providing the remaining shareholders the option to purchase the interest of the "dissolv-
ing" shareholder for fair value determined by negotiation or by the court, give minority
and non-management shareholders a potentially powerful right to use in the bargaining
process with the majority. PaoPosEn AcT §§13-14. Such rights are not readily available
under the present IBCA. See note 160 and accompanying text infra.
34. For a discussion of the view that it should be a mandatory provision, see Hethering-
ton, supra note 23, at 22.
35. E.g., a uniform rule giving every heir the power to dissolve a corporation, subject
only to the ability of the other parties to fund a buy-out, would be destructive.
36. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §1.13(a), at 52.
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adopt the regulatory scheme governing public corporations." This
affirmative and orderly decision-making process required to
transform a close corporation to a public corporation seems no
more detrimental or impeding than the affirmative decision-
making process required to change a partnership into a corpora-
tion.
It is true that a competent and creative lawyer can meet most
of the needs of any particular group of owners of an Illinois close
corporation by means of carefully drafted articles of incorpora-
tion, bylaws and shareholders agreements, which go over, under
and through the strictures of the IBCA.38 It is also evident that
the Illinois courts continue to show benevolent paternalism when
dealing with close corporations by bending, stretching, or over-
looking the letter of the statute in order to give effect to the
legitimate expectations of the parties. 9 Nevertheless, the fact
remains that intricate planning and drafting is expensive and the
lawyers' fees which such an effort demands are beyond the means
of most small businesses and their owners. This problem is com-
pounded when one of the owners of the business becomes dissatis-
fied and, noting the absence of clear legislative statement validat-
ing counsel's business plan, decides to repudiate the agreement,
thereby submitting it to court review. While ultimately the court
is likely to uphold the questioned agreement, bylaw, or article in
the interests of furthering close corporations, as a practical mat-
ter, the time, expense, and ill will generated by the litigation are
likely to doom the business. By the time the squabble is resolved
by the courts, dissolution is often the only realistic solution. 0
37. PROPOSED Acr §7.
38. Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages: Planning for
the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 427 (1954); O'Neal, Close Corporation Control
Devices (pts. 1-2), 61 ILL. B.J. 118, 186 (1972).
39. See, e.g., Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d
57 (5th Dist. 1972). But see Somers v. AAA Temp. Serv., Inc., 5 Ill. App. 3d 931, 284
N.E.2d 462 (1st Dist. 1972).
40. In several recent cases involving Illinois close corporations the ultimate solution has
been to order the dissolution of the corporation involved. See, e.g., Gray v. Hall, 10 Ill.
App. 3d 1030, 295 N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1973); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co.,
6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (5th Dist. 1972); Ward v. Colcord, 110 fI1. App.2d 68,
249 N.E.2d 137 (1st Dist. 1969). While it is not clear that either the court or the parties
would have been able to achieve continuation of the business, if there were a comprehen-
sive statutory scheme governing close corporations, it is at least possible that they would
1975]
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This Article is yet another plea for separate, comprehensive
legislation to govern the affairs of close corporations4 and an
attempt to highlight and define some of the major conceptual
changes which are necessary for successful legislation in the area.
Since the close corporation has been accurately described as an
incorporated partnership,42 partnership as well as corporation law
should be considered in formulating the special statute for gov-
erning the entity. This Article, therefore, will integrate the Uni-
form Partnership Act43 as well as the IBCA into the ensuing dis-
cussions. Furthermore, references will be made to the Illinois Pro-
posed Corporation Act in order to evaluate its potential effective-
ness.
II. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS
Logic dictates that if a state is to create a statutory scheme for
governing the activities of close corporations, some attempt must
first be made at defining the entity subject to the legislation. It
is clear that the statute should not govern a corporation whose
shares are actively traded in the public market, but should govern
a corporation owned exclusively by one natural shareholder. Be-
yond these obvious extremes the term "close corporation," like
"obscenity," seems incapable of precise definition. This inability
to define for all purposes what is and is not a close corporation
should not be used by the legislature, however, as an excuse for
declining to enact a statute providing comprehensive treatment
of its problems.44 Ignoring the ambiguities places the burden of
have been able to explore more fully whether economic analysis suggested the preferability
of continuation to liquidation. Cf. Collins, Survey of Illinois Law: Corporations, 23 DEPAUL
L. REV. 220, 230-31 (1973).
41. See note 21, supra.
42. See generally Hornstein, supra note 22.
43. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 1/2, §§1 et seq. (1973) [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr].
44. Folk, The Model Act and The South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 275,
282-83 (1963). See also Wolens, supra note 21, at 820:
The New York Business Corporation Law of 1961 represents the culmination of
five years of extensive law revision effort, and the expenditure of more than one
third of a million dollars. It is interesting that in such a complete revision New
York chose a unified corporate statute basically applicable to public and close
corporations alike. The decision was apparently made because of the New York
Law Revision Commission's articulated inability to arrive at a precise definition
[Vol. 25:1
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both definition and solution on the courts which must fill in those
areas where corporation legislation has left gaps.4"
It is the author's position that it is possible to identify the socio-
economic concept encompassed by the term with sufficient clar-
ity to permit a statute to be drafted which will meet the needs of
the conceptualized entity. There are two features which can be
identified as clearly essential to the existence of a close corpora-
tion: (1) a strong indication of an intention that the securities of
the corporation not be publicly distributed or traded; and (2) the
presence in the articles of meaningful restriction on the free alien-
ability of the corporation's shares.46 Special treatment as a close
corporation should be offered only to those corporations which
possess, at least, these characteristics.
The Closely-Held and the Closed Aspects of the Close
Corporation
In the past there have been numerous legislative attempts to
define close corporation. For the most part these attempts have
been based upon two of the traditional concepts associated with
the close corporation: (1) that of the "closely-held" corporation
where the corporation has a small number of shareholders, and
(2) that of the "closed" corporation where membership is limited
by means of restrictions on the transfer of shares, and so forth.4 '
of the close corporation which would clearly separate it from the publicly held
enterprise (footnotes omitted).
45. Traditional notions of legal process suggest it is far better for the legislature to at
least make an attempt at definition in order to provide the judiciary with some foundation
on which to build. A court would be better able to fulfill the legitimate intentions of the
parties and thus reduce doubt and uncertainty in planning when there is some indication
of legislative intent rather than none at all. Cf. Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close
Corporation, 73 HtAv. L. REv. 1532, 1549 (1960). See also Israels, The Close Corporation
and the Law, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 488 (1948).
46. This definition approximates, with one significant change to give recognition to the
permanent closed nature of the close corporation, that adopted by the Illinois judiciary:
"... a close corporation is one in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few
families and wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling." Galler
v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965) citing Brooks v. Willicuts, 78 F.2d 270,
273 (8th Cir. 1935).
47. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §1.04, at 7. Tennery, supra note 18, at 249. See also 1
F. O'NEAL, supra §1.07, at 21:
A close corporation typically has the following attributes: (1) the shareholders
are few in number, often only two or three; (2) they usually live in the same
1975]
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Since there are probably many more closely-held corporations
than closed corporations in this country," most attempts to de-
fine close corporations have tried to play, in whole or in part,
some sort of numbers game. As early as 1907, England drew dis-
tinctions between "public" and "private" companies at the
boundary between fifty and fifty-one members." A few American
definitions of close corporations have also relied solely on num-
bers.5 0 Most definitions which use a numbers test however,
usually include some additional limitations such as denying the
corporation a public stock issue, or requiring some restriction on
the transfer of shares.5 The transfer restriction requirements are
an acknowledgment of the "closed" nature of a close corporation,
whereas the primary thrust of these numbers tests is to try to
make finite the notion that a close corporation is closely-held.
While the latter might encompass the social concept of what a
geographical area, know each other, and are well acquainted with each other's
business skills; (3) all or most of the shareholders are active in the business,
usually serving as directors or officers or as keymen in some managerial capac-
ity; and (4) there is no established market for the corporate stock, the shares
not being listed on a stock exchange or actively dealt in by brokers; little or no
trading takes place in the shares (footnotes omitted).
48. Carrington, Book Review, 26 TENN. L. REV. 448, 449 (1959).
49. McFadyean, The American Close Corporation and Its British Equivalent, 14 Bus.
L. 215, 216-17 (1958). Cf. COMPANIES AcT OF 1948, 11 & 12 GEO. 6, c. 38, §28. Interestingly,
the equivalents of U.S. close corporations in continental Europe, such as the German
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GMBH), do not seem to be based at all on the
number of shareholders but are similar to the closed corporation concept. Schneider, The
American Close Corporation and Its German Equivalent, 14 Bus. L. 228 (1958). The same
is true for the French equivalent of the American Close Corporation, the Socit d Respon-
sabilit6 Limit~e (SARL). Rawlings, The French Company Law: Choice of Corporate Form
Available to the Foreign Investor, 30 Bus. L. 1251 (1975). Both the French and German
statutes have devices limiting the negotiability of shares in close corporations. France also
has a requirement of approval of new shareholders by the vote of existing shareholders.
Japan with its Yugen Kaisha, as well as Canada, also have close corporation statutes.
Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism,
27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696, 719 n.105 (1960).
50. See, e.g., P.R. LAWS CODE ANN. tit. 14, §1102(c) (1971) (11 shareholders); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §7-1.1-51(d)(1969) (30 shareholders); WYo. STAT. ANN. §17-36.32(c),(d) (1965)
(20 shareholders). Compare INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1371(a), which defines a small busi-
ness corporation for purposes of subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code as one with
one class of stock and not more than ten natural or estate shareholders.
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 8, §342 (1974) (30 shareholders, no public offer by
corporation, restriction on transfer); KAN. STAT. ANN. §17-7202 (Supp. 1972) (same); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1372 (Supp. 1975) (same); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1(A)
(Supp. 1975) (35 shareholders, no public offer, restriction on transfer).
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close corporation is, namely, a corporation which is owned by a
small number of shareholders who theoretically live and work in
relative close proximity," it gives no recognition to the relevant
economic component of a close corporation.
From an economic viewpoint, a close corporation resembles an
incorporated partnership more than a public corporation. While
the owners of a public corporation are looking for an appreciation
of invested capital through the labors of others, namely the man-
agement, the owners of a close corporation are seeking a return
based on their own labors.53 Any notion of speculation on the
appreciation of invested capital is at best secondary. Similar to
the members of a partnership, the owners of a close corporation
are primarily looking for income in the form of salaries, divi-
dends, or other distributions. They expect some voice in the con-
trol of the business and are usually not content to permit others
to have complete authority over the fate of their investment.
Moreover, they contemplate liquidation of their investment in
the close corporation as an extraordinary event, certainly not to
be contemplated in the ordinary course, but which is likely to
occur only in the case of death, termination and/or dissolution of
the close corporation.
The presence of less than a given number of co-owners is irrele-
vant to these economic objectives and thus the status of a close
corporation should not be determined by numbers.54 It is arbi-
52. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §1.07, at 21. The point should be made that a close
corporation statute should be limited to corporations which are owned by natural share-
holders, estates, family trusts and the like, or subsidiaries of such corporations. It makes
no sense to permit a wholly-owned subsidiary of a public corporation which, of course, has
only one shareholder, or a joint venture corporation owned by a small consortium of public
corporations, to be subject to a system of regulation far different from that of the public
parent or parents. Cf. Weiner, Proposing a New York 'Close Corporation Law, '28 CORNELL
L.Q. 313, 315 (1943). See also 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, § 1.06(a), at 15; INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, §1371(a). Otherwise this loophole might give rise to the types of abuses which
characterized the massive public utility holding company empires in the first third of the
twentieth century. See generally W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 127-69 (1940).
However, an exception might be considered to permit corporate venture capital investors
to participate in close corporations so long as they did not participate actively in the
management of the business.
53. Tennery, supra note 18, at 251.
54. Although it seems anomalous, there is a minimum number of partners needed to
form a partnership, two. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §6(l). Any number of persons, from
one ad infinitum, can form and own a corporation. IBCA §§ 34, 46.
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trary and absurd to require that a close corporation have less than
X number of members, or to say that one which has one more
than X number of members is a different entity which should be
subject to a scheme of regulation designed primarily for large
public corporations." Instead, the nature of a close corporation
and its achievement of the stated objectives are dependent on the
presence of an owners' agreement, embodying their expectations
and an assurance that in the event of a dispute these expectations
will be recognized and honored by the legal process.
Just as a numbers test defining the closely-held aspect of the
close corporation appears inappropriate, attempts to define the
closed aspect of the close corporation are also unsatisfactory.
There seem to be two methods of defining the latter concept: the
statutes either refer to the existence or lack thereof of a public
market for the shares, and/or they require some kind of restric-
tions on the transferability of the shares.
Inclusion of a general provision restricting the public marketa-
bility for the shares of a close corporation is an attempt by the
legislatures to link the small number of shareholders with the
concept of the selective club. This type of provision, which several
states have adopted,5" seems to presume that if there is no trading
market there will not be a large number of shareholders. Moreo-
ver, if there is no trading market there will be such a small num-
ber of potential buyers that the non-selling owners can have an
effective veto power over any potential buyer by simply outbid-
ding that buyer or by enforcing a prior agreement.57
However, this logic fails on two counts. First, a general provi-
sion that the shares not be publicly traded by the owners does not
prevent the shares from being publicly issued by the corporation.
55. Some states have attempted to reduce the arbitrary nature of the numbers rule by
establishing attribution rules similar to those of section 318 of the Internal Revenue Code,
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §318, which have the effect of reducing the numbers of sharehold-
ers. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.30-1(A) (Supp. 1975). The nature of such
attribution rules simply highlights the arbitrary nature of a numbers test. The nature of
the corporation does not change if one more shareholder of record exists than is permitted
under the counting scheme arbitrarily established by the definitional statute.
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.70(2) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §620(b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1963). Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §618(3) (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-
73(b) (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§16.22(c),22.14(b) (Supp. 1974).
57. Comment, Definition of the Close Corporation, 16 VAND. L. REv. 1267, 1269 (1963);
Note, 75 HAv. L. REv. 852, 854 (1962).
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Thus the corporation may issue shares or a shareholder may dis-
tribute to a large number of buyers without creating an active
public trading market. The results will be a close corporation
which is in reality not closely held.58 The existence or non-
existence of a public trading market should not be the focus for
defining the closely-held corporation aspect of a close corpora-
tion.59 Emphasis should center upon the question of public distri-
butions of securities by either the corporation or any shareholder.
The latter is an approach which several legislatures,"0 as well as
our British cousins have already partly recognized."' The close
corporation statute should acknowledge the traditional notion
that a close corporation is one with a relatively small number of
shareholders by requiring it to prohibit in the articles any public
offering or distribution of the securities by the corporation or its
security holders. The unresolved issue is defining "public
offering, or distribution," something which neither the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission nor state legislatures have
been able to do with satisfactory precision." The practices of the
58. For example, suppose the sole owner of a large corporation decided, for political or
social reasons, to have the corporation make a gift of one share of stock to each of the
corporation's five hundred employees while retaining the remaining 99,500 shares for him/
herself. It is hard to imagine even without restrictions on transfer that an active trading
market would develop in such shares since they would be virtually without value. Never-
theless such a corporation would be a close corporation in a state such as Florida. FLA.
STAT. ANN. §608.70 (2) (Supp. 1975). It would also be considered public by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and be required to file periodic disclosure reports under section
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 unless an exemption was allowed. 15 U.S.C.
§78(e) (1970).
59. See Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment that Failed, 21 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 842 (1967). The author also points out the evils inherent in such vague terms
as "generally traded" which are characteristic of statutory definitions of close corporation.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-73(b) (1975) ("generally traded"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN. §620(c) (McKinney 1963) ("regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market"); S.C.
CODE tit. 12 §16-22(c) (Supp. 1974) ("regularly traded").
60. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §342(a)(3) (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§1372(a)(3) (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §17-7202(a)(3) (Supp. 1972).
61. ENGLISH COMPANIES AcT, 1948, 11 & 12 GEO. 6, c.38, §28(c).
62. If the question of public offering or distribution were left to Illinois law, a numbers
test would probably be established. The Illinois Blue Sky law apparently fixes a public
offering by its exemptive provisions as one which is not made to more than fifty persons
in any twelve month period, and a public distribution seems to be one in which securities
are not sold to more than twenty-five buyers in any twelve month period. Both of the
foregoing are subject to fairly complex statutory counting adjustment rules. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 137.4(G), (H), (M) (1973). In any case, the definition is unsatisfactory
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Delaware legislature and those states which have followed the
Delaware pattern of tying the definition of public distribution to
whatever posture the SEC decides to adopt at any given mo-
ment,"3 seems better than any available alternative despite the
legitimate criticisms it has received."
The second failing of the "not generally traded" definitional
approach is that it in no way acknowledges the closed member-
ship, quasi-partnership attribute of the close corporation. There
is nothing in such a definition which insures each of the owners a
veto right with respect to any change of associates by addition or
substitution. Yet this right is basic to the concept of a close corpo-
ration, just as is delectus personae (choice of person) a fundamen-
tal doctrine of partnership, recognized by the Uniform Partner-
ship Act.5
A close corporation statute should afford recognition to the fact
that delectus personae is an equally crucial concept in defining a
close corporation. It is this quasi-partnership aspect of a close
corporation which clearly separates it from its public counterpart.
Therefore while the shares of a public corporation must be freely
transferable for economic reasons,6" the shares of a close corpora-
for a close corporation, since the focus on twelve month periods would permit annual
increases by up to twenty-five in the number of shareholders, a rate of growth which seems
to be antithetical to traditional concepts of close corporations. See note 47, supra.
63. For a recent change in the SEC view of what is not a public offering of stock, see
SEC Rule 146 under the Securities Act of 1933, 39 FED. REG. 15261(1974) as amended 40
FED. REG. 21709(1975). The concept of public distribution, as opposed to public offerings,
applies generally to transactions by one other than an issuer, in this context, a share-
holder. See, e.g., SEC Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R.230.144(1975).
Whether such a definition would apply to the "gift" in the example in note 58, supra is
not clear. However, as a practical matter, perhaps limitations on the numbers of donees
who can receive shares of a close corporation by way of gift or devise is not an appropriate
matter for a legislature but is best left to the parties' agreements on transfer restrictions.
64. See Comment, Delaware's Close-Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. L. REV. 230, 249
(1968); Note, Statutory Treatment of the Kansas Close Corporation, 13 WASHBURN L. REV.
494, 499 (1974).
65. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr §18(g), provides that unless the parties agree otherwise
in the partnership agreement, "[no person can become a member of a partnership
without the consent of all the partners." See also J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND
BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 43-44 (1968). Although a partner in a general partnership has
a right to participate in management, he is not required to do so. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
Acr §18(e); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra at 374; Ellie v. Babbett, 259 Ore. 590, 488
P.2d 440 (1971).
66. See note 12, supra.
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tion must not be freely transferable for economic reasons.
While the prohibition of public issue or trading of a
corporation's securities is designed to insure the closely-held as-
pect of a close corporation, it does nothing to guarantee closed
membership characteristics. It offers no protection against the
possibility that a shareholder may, in a private sale, transfer his
securities to an individual who is undesirable to the other share-
holders. The most effective method, which several states have
adopted in whole or in part, 7 to protect shareholders against such
involuntary associates is to restrict each owner's right to transfer
his shares at the time of issue in order to afford the other owners
a veto power over any new business associate.6 Therefore, the
statutory definition of a close corporation should require the arti-
cles of incorporation to provide that the transfer of all shares of
all classes, or of securities convertible into shares, or of securities
with voting rights, be subject to one or more types of transfer
restrictions, 9 which would be enumerated in the statute."
While the existence of an effective restriction on transfer of the
shares is an essential prerequisite for treatment as a closed corpo-
ration, the restriction should not include the suggestion of some
authors that all owners actively participate in or be related by
blood or marriage to the management of the corporation.7 This
67. See statutes cited in note 51, supra.
68. Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F.
139.
69. There seems to be no need to require any restriction on the transfer of straight debt
securities, which have neither a conversion right nor absolute or contingent voting rights.
70. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text infra for an explanation of the types of
restrictions.
71. C. ISRAELS & A. HOFFMAN, CORPORATE PRACTICE 56-57 (1975). See also Note,
Definition of the Close Corporation, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (1963):
A close corporation is a corporation in which the owners of all the voting securi-
ties are engaged in the management of the corporation.
(1) Voting securities do not include those securities to which voting
rights accrue only on the happening of a contingency.
(2) Management means (a) active participation, apart from the ex-
ercise of voting rights, in the formulation of corporate policy or in the
making of decisions which affect corporate policy, or (b) day to day
duties involving supervision of corporate operations or personnel (foot-
notes omitted).
The author suggests that the application of this definition should be subject to family
attribution rules similar to those of section 318 of the Internal Revenue Code, INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, §318. Note, supra, at 1272 n.25.
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requirement seems to be a needless restriction on financial plan-
ning for the close corporation since it eliminates the venture capi-
talist, who is recognized in the law of partnership as a limited
partner who may invest but has no power to manage.72 There
seems to be no reason to exclude these individuals from close
corporations since the separation of ownership and management
is not in inherent conflict with the concept of a close corporation.
In summary, the definition of a close corporation should be
one whose articles contain a prohibition on the public offer or
distribution of its securities and one whose articles restrict the
free transferability of any shares or voting securities. These two
characteristics effectively preclude the public corporation from
electing close corporation treatment. The definition proposed
herein assumes that the statute will afford the close corporation
the option of choosing whether it wishes to be governed by the
special statutory scheme or whether it prefers to conduct its busi-
ness under the IBCA.73 In order to effectuate the purpose of a close
corporation statute, which is greater planning flexibility, it is only
natural that the close corporation be able to choose the governing
scheme which will provide the structure best suited to its particu-
lar needs. Thus, treatment as a close corporation should be left
to the discretion of all the owner-partners, since it is a fundamen-
tal concern and, like the adoption or alteration of a partnership
agreement, should require unanimous consent.74 But, a unani-
72. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061/2, §50 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT]; J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note
65, at 147-48. See also UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §18 (e). The venture capitalist may
become a partner in a general partnership and yield any right to manage by agreement
without changing the nature of the partnership.
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §341(a) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.70(1) (Supp.
1975); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT, ANN. art. 2.30-1(A), (D)-(F) (Supp. 1975). See also Bateman
& Dawson, The 1975 Amendments to the Texas Business Corporation Act and the Texas
Securities Act, 6 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 951, 974-83 (1975).
74. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 65, at 276. Of course, the law permits amend-
ment of a partnership agreement by less than unanimous consent where the partners have
agreed on a lesser percentage in advance. The same rule should apply to a corporation
choosing whether it should be treated as a close corporation. All owners should consent
to the election unless the articles provide otherwise. However, if the owners provide for a
.lesser percentage, then no amendment to the articles changing the percentage required
for an election is to be permitted with the approval of any smaller percentage. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. §17-7206 (Supp. 1972). Otherwise, there would be an obvious inconsis-
tency, in as much as the percentage set to decide on close corporation treatment could be
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mous shareholder vote for the special treatment is not the only
consideration,75 lest the scheme be subject to potential abuse by
public corporations through the formation of holding company
subsidiaries." The electing corporation must still meet the defini-
tional requirements.
The proposed Illinois Close Corporation Act contains appropri-
ate provisions giving the close corporation the option to be subject
to either the proposed Close Corporation Act or the IBCA,77 and
provides a method for new7 or existing corporations7" to make the
election. A close corporation under this proposal is defined as a
corporation all of whose shares of each class are subject to one or
more of a list of enumerated restrictions on transfer including: (1)
the existence of a right of first refusal in one or more fellow share-
holders or other persons; (2) the existence of the right in the
corporation or any class of shareholders to veto any proposed
transferee; (3) a prohibition on transfer of shares to any desig-
nated person or class of persons (e.g. competitors); (4) a prohibi-
tion of any transfer which would endanger the right to taxation
as a small business corporation under subchapter S of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code; or (5) an imposition of "any other lawful re-
striction on transfer or registration of transfer of shares.""0
The definition of a close corporation in the Proposed Act rec-
ognizes and protects, albeit not as clearly as it might,"' the closed
nature of the close corporation. However, it does nothing to re-
quire the maintenance of the closely-held nature of such a busi-
altered by a smaller percentage of the shareholders. It should be noted that the state's
interest in setting a percentage to determine close corporation treatment lies only in
enforcing the shareholders' agreement, and not in passing on its wisdom.
75. In contrast, the Maryland definition provides that a close corporation is one which
determines that it is such by unanimous vote of its shareholders, which clearly states that
it is such in its charter, and which identifies itself as such in its stock certificates. MD.
CORP. AND Ass'N CODE ANN. §4-201 (1975). No requirements of prohibition of public issue
of shares or transfer restrictions are imposed.
76. See note 52, supra.
77. PROPOSED Acr §2(a). Election implies a specific statutory procedure. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§343-44. (1974); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1(E) (Supp. 1975).
See also Dickson, supra note 59, at 844-45.
78. PROPOSED ACT §4.
79. Id. §5.
80. Id. §3.
81. See notes 131-34 and accompanying text infra.
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ness. There is nothing in the Act which prohibits the corporation
or a shareholder from making a public offer or distribution of his
shares without sacrificing the close corporation qualifications.8" It
is therefore necessary to add a provision to the Proposed Act that
a corporation be required to include in its articles a prohibition
on public offer or distribution of its securities by either a security-
holder or the corporation in order to qualify as a close corporation.
This provision insures that the qualifying corporation be both
closed and closely-held-a true close corporation.
III. CONTROL OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION
Once the close corporation is defined and identified, the initial
problems which the shareholders face are how the business shall
be managed and to whom the shares may be transferred.
A. Management
One of the most attractive features of the partnership is that
it provides the owners with maximum flexibility in ordering the
internal affairs of their common enterprise. 3 They can structure
the management in any way they desire, and no notion of public
82. Conceivably, a corporation could create a special class of shares, e.g. class Z and
issue all shares thereof to its transfer agent for a nominal consideration. It could than
provide in its articles and note on the certificates that all transfers of stock of any class
are subject to approval by the holders of class Z. The corporation could then sell its shares
to the public with the transfer agent approving each transferee by informal "vote" each
time shares were bought or sold. See IBCA §147. The corporation would still be a close
corporation under section 3(a) (2) of the Proposed Act, although vastly different from
traditional notions of what a close corporation is supposed to be. The plan may sound
strained, but strained plans have not been unknown to Illinois corporate planners in the
past. See, e.g., Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 II1. 2d 471, 272 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
Other examples can be thought of, although less probable, whereby a corporation could
be or become public and have an active market in its shares while still meeting the
definition of the Proposed Act.
83. The partnership is managed by the owners themselves pursuant to whatever man-
agement agreement they create. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §18. See also Bernstein, Bern-
stein, Wile & Gordon v. Ross, 22 Mich. App. 117, 177 N.W. 2d 193 (1970); J. CRANE & A.
BROMBERG, supra note 65, at 374. While in the absence of any agreement each partner has
an equal voice in management and control, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §18(e); Polikopf v.
Levy, 55 Ill. App.2d 229, 204 N.E. 2d 807, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965), the members
have the power to alter the management arrangement according to their own preferences.
Elle v. Babbitt, 259 Ore. 590, 488 P.2d 440 (1971).
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policy will upset the bargain the owners have reached. The part-
nership entity, however, has several major drawbacks; the owners
are personally liable for the debts of the business,8 4 and the part-
nership entity does not survive the death or bankruptcy of any of
the partners. 5 In order to avoid the possibility of certain adverse
consequences flowing from these factors, partnerships often elect
incorporation, and the close corporation is the result.86 Yet, the
nature of the business has not changed; the same associates make
and sell the same products. As partners they were perfectly free
to agree among themselves how the business should be managed.
Now that they are legally identified as a corporation, they still
should be able to manage their internal affairs as they see fit. The
state and the creditors have no greater interest in how the busi-
ness is managed when it is transformed into a close corporation
conforming to the statutory definition discussed above.87 The
ability of the close corporation, like the partnership which pre-
ceded it, to pay its debts as they mature is determined by the
entrepreneurial skills of the owner-managers.
Unfortunately, traditional notions of general corporate law do
not accept this logic, and in the absence of legislative direction
to the contrary the courts cling to these archaic views.
The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business
as partners may incorporate, with intent to obtain the advan-
tages and immunities of a corporate form and then, Proteus-
like, become at will a copartnership or a corporation, as the
exigencies or purposes of their joint enterprise may from time
to time require.
If they adopt the corporate form, with the corporate shield
extended over them to protect them against personal liability,
they cease to be partners and have only the rights, duties and
84. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr §15; Bayles v. Bennett, 22 III.App.3d 144, 316 N.E. 2d
792 (4th Dist. 1974); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 65, at 334-35.
85. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§31(4)-(5); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 65, at
432-35. The agreement may provide for the continuation of the business despite the case
of the death of a partner. Oneida State Bank v. Peterson, 226 Il1. App. 381 (2d Dist. 1922).
86. C. ISRAELS & A. HOFFMAN, supra note 71, at 8.




obligations of stockholders. They cannot be partners inter sese
and a corporation as to the rest of the world. 9
The legislatures are as adamant as the judiciary in elevating
form over substance. The legislative direction in Illinois remains
absolute. "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be man-
aged by a board of directors."8 No distinction is made between
Commonwealth Edison and the corner drugstore. 0 If a corpora-
tion exists, it must have directors and those directors must man-
age its affairs. This requirement has value in the context of large
public corporations and is in accord with the traditional notion
that capital has hired management.9 The resulting separation of
ownership and management gives the state a legitimate interest
in creating a system for protecting identifiable interests. Corpo-
rate hierarchy places the duties of protection and balancing of the
shareholders', creditors', and employees' interests on the direc-
tors. It is they who decide whether creditor protection requires
that no dividend be paid,92 and who hire and fire officers. 3 The
directors must, in the first instance, propose the fundamental
management changes which will drastically affect the fate of the
shareholders' investment. 4
While the requirement of a board of directors makes eminent
sense in the context of a public corporation, it is not necessarily
in the best interests of a close corporation where the investors
may or may not have the need, means, or the desire to hire some-
one else to manage their capital. The state has no legitimate
88. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 599, 75 A. 568, 571 (Ct' Err. & App. 1910).
89. IBCA §34.
90. Actually, there is one minor distinction drawn in the IBCA between the corner
drugstore and Commonwealth Edison,. an Illinois corporation. Commonwealth Edison
must have to have at least three directors since it has more than two stockholders. The
comer drugstore on the other hand would only need to have as many directors as stock-
holders. IBCA §34. Consequently, the incorporated individual is required to go through
the statutory requirement of electing himself a director to run his affairs.
91. Dodd, The Modern Corporation Private Property and Recent Federal Legislation,
54 HnAv. L. REv. 917,921 (1941).
92. IBCA § 41. See also id. §§41(a), 6.
93. Id. §43.
94. Id. § 61 (merger), § 72 (sale of assets). Obviously, fundamental transactions are
subject to shareholder approval. However, unless the board of directors decides to propose




interest in protecting the parties from themselves, and in this
context there is little a state can do to protect third parties,
creditors, and non-owner employees, from the defalcations of the
owner-managers beyond that which it has already done; namely,
the imposition of personal liability on the wrongdoers. 5
If the requirement of a board of directors is adhered to for the
close corporation one of two things will happen: either it will be
ignored or it will be observed by meaningless formalities." Since
the directors will be those owners who wish to participate in man-
agement, the parties will go through the legal motions of corpo-
rate form, but they will attempt to preserve the attributes of a
partnership by means of special provisions in the articles, bylaws,
or in shareholders' or directors' agreements. 7 These agreements
will insure that the traditional notion of the role of a board of
directors," as independent of and separate from the shareholders
in its decision-making process, exists only on paper in the corpo-
rate minute books. Thus the parties will attempt to comply with
the law by emasculating it.
These attempts to avoid the requirement of a board of directors
can present a great variety of problems depending on the particu-
lar method employed. Although a survey of the close corporation
control devices available and the vast amount of litigation which
they have produced is beyond the scope of this paper,9 two of the
more common devices and problems should be mentioned in
order to illustrate the impropriety of the director management
requirement in this context. One is to fill the board of directors
with nominees or "dummy" directors who can be relied on with-
95. See generally notes 24-35 and accompanying text supra.
96. "All of this structure of representative government in the typical corporation law is
about as appropriate for a two-man get-together as Robert's Rules of order." Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L.REv.
432, 433 (1956).
97. Cary, supra note 38, at 430-33. See also O'Neal, supra note 38, at 118.
98. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 333, 189 N.E. 234, 238 (1934) (concurring
opinion); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §3.12, at 16. Cf. Levin v. Hunter, 6 11. App.2d 461,
128 N.E. 2d 630 (1st Dist. 1955).
99. See also W. CARY, supra note 9, at 362-512; Hornstein, Shareholders Agreements in
the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950); O'Neal, supra note 15; Note,
Specific Enforcement of Shareholders Voters Agreements, 15 U. Cm. L. REV. 738 (1948);




out formal agreeement to do the bidding of the shareholder whom
they represent. The traditional purpose of the board of directors
is to act as a kind of "Platonic Guardian"' ' of the generally
conflicting interests of shareholders, creditors, and employees of
the corporation. In the event that these parties are not afforded
the protections of the business corporation law, the director is to
be personally answerable.
Courts, however, have shown understandable reluctance in the
context of a close corporation to hold nominee "dummy" direc-
tors liable for the defalcations of the "partner" directors, suggest-
ing that the injured party should look to the latter for recom-
pense. 0' This is the general rule in Illinois.'"2 It is inconsistent to
require a director to protect designated interests and then refuse
to hold him liable in the circumstance where such protection is
needed. These directors serve no legal purpose.
Another device used to comply with the requirement of a board
of directors is to create a board but limit its freedom to act by
shareholders' or directors' agreement or by bylaw or article. The
IBCA is silent on the validity of such efforts, and it is difficult to
predict the enforceability thereof. In the absence of a statutory
provision to the contrary, shareholders' or directors' agreements
which overly restrict the directors in their power to manage the
corporation will be struck down by the courts.'"3 Any corporate
100. Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate
Anachronism, 27 U. CI. L. REV. 696, 697-98 (1960).
101. See, e.g., Sears v. Weissman, 6 Ill. App.3d 827, 286 N.E. 2d 777 (1st Dist. 1972).
102. Id. But cf. De Met's Inc. v. Insull, 122 F.2d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 1941). Contra,
Wallach v. Billings, 277 Ill. 218, 115 N.E. 382, cert. denied, 244 U.S. 659 (1917). See
generally Israels, A New Look at Corporate Directorship, 24 Bus. LAW. 727, 729-32 (1969).
Again, this seems to be an area where the Illinois courts, at least sub silentio, have drawn
two different rules of law respecting "dummy" directors, one for public corporations and
one for close corporations.
103. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §275, at 543-45 (2d ed. 1970). See, e.g., Teich v.
Kaufman, 174 Ill. App. 306 (1st Dist. 1912). A distinction must be drawn here between
two types of agreements. Those which bind shareholders to act in a particular way as
shareholders (e.g., vote for certain named persons as directors) are valid and will be
upheld in the absence of fraud or breach of some fiduciary duty. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT §34 (1969); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 730 (2d ed. 1971); Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947);
Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589, 73 N.E. 2d 874 (1905); Trefethen v. Amazlen, 93 N.H.
110, 36 A. 2d 266 (1944); Note, Shareholder Pooling Agreements - Validity, Legality and
Enforcement, 24 ARK. L. REv. 501 (1971). However, agreements among shareholders which
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planner is aware of the voluminous litigation dealing with the
validity of agreements in this area.'"4 This difficulty is heightened
by the fact that two separate lines of decisions have developed
distinguishing the courts' treatment of public corporations and
close corporations. Control agreements which would be invalid in
the context of a public corporation are upheld by the courts if the
business is a close corporation.'"5 In this regard the planner is left
to surmise what the judicial reaction to his particular scheme
may be.
A board of directors, with formal requirements of numbers,
elections, etc., adds nothing of social or economic value to the
owners, employees, or creditors of a close corporation. The mere
existence of a board in the close corporation raises traditional
concepts of independent discretion and fiduciary obligation
which only serve to complicate what seems to the owners simple
business matters. Routine partnership agreements respecting
such matters as long-term employment contracts and future
profit distributions suddenly become intricate legal questions
when the partnership incorporates. A long-term employment con-
tract providing that one partner shall be employed as president
and general manager of the corporation may be viewed by a court
as an impermissible infringement on the power of future boards
of directors to fulfill the statutory mandate that "the officers of
a corporation shall be elected by the board of directors."' 06
bind the parties to do something in their capacity as directors (e.g., hire a certain person
to fill a certain office over a long period of time), or otherwise seek to create a sterilized
board of directors are generally held invalid by courts as an improper limitation on the
statutory power and duty of the directors to provide independent management of corpo-
rate affairs. See, e.g., West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263
N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Amos v. Helwig, 19 Ill. App.2d 220, 153 N.E. 2d 245 (1st
Dist. 1958); Matter of Glekel, 37 App. Div. 2d 1, 321 N.Y.S. 2d 956 (1971).
104. See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §5.06, at 18-22.
105. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E. 2d 577 (1965); Clark v. Dodge,
269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). But see Somers v. AAA Temp. Serv., 5 111. App.3d 931,
284 N.E. 2d 462 (1st Dist. 1972).
106. IBCA §43. Such a long-term employment contract would probably also be vulnera-
ble to attack as an illegal derogation of the directorial power to remove officers. Id. §44.
This seemingly basic concept of the power to provide for the future management of the
corporation has caused great difficulties to planners and courts alike. It is legal in Illinois
for some or all of the shareholders to agree among themselves to vote for certain designated
persons as directors. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Il1. 54, 116 N.E.
648 (1917); Venner v. Chicago City Ry., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N.E. 949 (1913); Faulds v. Yates,
1975]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
Similarly an agreement by less than all of the partners to vote
that future profits shall or shall not be distributed in the form of
cash dividends under certain terms and conditions is clearly valid
and enforceable unless in conflict with the partnership agree-
ment.'"7 A like agreement among the same number of partners
who opt for the corporate form, or an agreement among some
shareholders that "their" directors will vote to declare certain
dividends when legal, is at least potentially vulnerable to attack.
A court might find that the agreement constitutes a restraint on
the discretion of the directors in the area of dividends which is
violative of public policy and therefore should not be judicially
enforced.'"8
57 Ill. 416 (1870), subject to the caveat that such an agreement might conceivably be
characterized as a voting trust and hence be vulnerable under IBCA §30(a). It would seem
that the same group of the shareholders should also be permitted to freeze those same
directors as officers for some given period of time. Thus, if the designated directors were
owner-partners, they would be assured without risk of termination in the event of a falling
out, that at least part of the return to them would be deductible salary for some definite
period of time (a crucial distinction to the owners of a non-subchapter S corporation). If
they were non-owners, the corporation could offer sufficient security in the form of a long-
term employment contract to attract capable management. See Cay, supra note 38, at
434. While both of these seem to be legitimate business goals neither the legislature nor
the courts has done much to aid the shareholders of close corporations in this regard.
Where the shareholders and the directors are identical, a contract between them and a
particular director granting him a position as an officer for ten years would probably be
binding on the parties. Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Ill. App. 343 (1st Dist. 1926). However,
if the identity of the shareholders and/or the directors changes, the validity and enforce-
ability of the agreement becomes more doubtful. Although it is binding on the original
parties, the agreement among all of the stockholders "might not have bound the board of
directors afterwards elected .. " Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589, 598, 73 N.E. 874,
878 (1905). In Kantzler, although the court upheld a long-term employment agreement
among all the shareholders, it made an observation which can hardly be comforting to the
close corporation planner. "lilt will be time enough to consider the rights of subsequent
stockholders and creditors of the corporation when they are before us complaining." Id.
at 600, 73 N.E. at 878. When "they" came before the court in Teich v. Kaufman, 174 I1.
App. 306 (1st Dist. 1912), Kantzler was carefully distinguished on the ground that it
governed only when all of the stockholders were parties to or aware of the illegal long-term
employment agreement. Id. at 314. See also West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890); Amos
v. Helwig, 19 111. App.2d 220, 153 N.E. 2d 245 (1st Dist. 1958); People v. Pyle, 235 I1. App.
532, 544 (3d Dist. 1924). But see Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964) and
Thompson v. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N.E. 648 (1917) (upholding agree-
ments among less than all shareholders).
107. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 65, at 366.
108. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, § 5.16, at 56. Such an attack was made and rejected
in Gaiter, 32 Ill. 2d at 33-34, 203 N.E. 2d at 586-87. However, the fact that it was rejected
in the context of Galler does not mean that it might not be made successfully in other
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The uncertainty of the fate of otherwise legitimate sharehold-
ers' agreements in the close corporate context can be eliminated
by two complementary statutory provisions, both of which ap-
pear in the Proposed Act. 109 The first provides that the question
of whether the business of the corporation is to be managed by a
board of directors or pursuant to shareholders' agreement is to be
resolved by the owners themselves in the articles of incorporation,
by original inclusion or appropriate amendment, and not by the
state pursuant to statutory fiat."' If the owners decide upon a
board of directors, the second statutory provision permits the
precise scope of discretion exercised by the board to be deter-
mined by the shareholders."' Consequently, the shareholders of
circumstances. The statute still requires that the dividend policy of a corporation remains
in the hands of the directors, IBCA §41, and an agreement among all or a controlling block
of shareholders to restrict the power of the board in that area would certainly challenge
the statutory policy. However, an agreement among shareholders that dividends be de-
clared (when there are profits) embodied in the articles or bylaws will be enforced because
it is part of the contract to which all shareholders subscribe. Cratty v. Peoria Law Lib.
Ass'n, 219 Il1. 516, 76 N.E. 707 (1906).
109. PROPOSED Acr §§11, 12.
110. Id. §12.
111. Id. §11(c). It is not necessary or appropriate, however, that the provision be limited
to only those agreements among all stockholders respecting the scope of directors' discre,
tion. There is no reason why any number of shareholders should not be able to agree among
themselves, in the absence of fraud, as to how "their" directors will act in a close corpora-
tion. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §350 (1974).
Similarly, the problems created by long-term employment contracts, see note 106,
supra, could be resolved by a simple provision specifying that agreements among any
number of stockholders, or directors, and/or the corporation, whereby some individual
should hold an office for an extended period of time, are valid and enforceable whether
the person holding the office is a shareholder or an outsider. The Proposed Act would
recognize and presumably permit specific enforcement of such agreements if entered into
by all shareholders. PROPOSED AcT §§11 (a)(2),(3),(6). There seems to be no reason for
limiting this to agreements among all shareholders. If the bylaws provide, for example,
that shareholders shall elect the officers, id. §12, there seems to be no reason why an
agreement among any number of shareholders to vote in a particular manner should not
be enforceable so long as it is disclosed and does not work a fraud on the other share-
holders. The Proposed Act, as presently drafted, would actually restrict the freedom
available to owners-of close corporations in the wake of Galler. Cf. Compton v. Paul K.
Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E. 2d 574 (5th Dist. 1972). See also ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 13-A, §§618 (1), (2) (1974), making agreements entered into by less than
all the shareholders valid and enforceable among the parties. Such an additional provision
would be advisableto clarify the agreement's validity and insure that it may be specifi-
cally enforced. Cf. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling,
29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A. 2d 441 (1947). A further caveat might be added prohibiting attack
on such agreements in the absence of fraud by shareholders or directors not parties
thereto.
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a close corporation may choose to reserve for themselves such
questions as dividend distribution or management contracts.
The effect of these provisions is to legislatively eliminate the
archaic concept that a business cannot be a corporation to the
world and a partnership to itself and its owners. The Proposed
Act,"I2 as well as a considerable number of statutes in other states,
has already accepted this concept."' Such provisions "should
demolish the mischievous heresy that the uninhibited control and
management of the business and affairs of a corporation by a
board of directors is part of the 'essence' of a corporation."" 4
Thus, a few simple statutory provisions can achieve the same
results as the intricate control devices which law teachers delight
in teaching, lawyers take so much pride in creating, and clients
are so unhappy paying for and perhaps ultimately litigating.
B. The Identity of the "Partners"
The identity of new partners in a partnership is entirely subject
to the will of the existing partners. As a general rule, "the other
partners cannot have a new partner thrust upon them without
112. PROPOSED Acr §11(b).
113. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §354 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.75 (2) (Supp.
1975); S.C. CODE ANN. §12-16.22 (a) (Supp. 1974); TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.30-2(A) (8)
(Supp. 1975).
114. Bradley, supra note 21, at 1177. The close corporation statute should also legitim-
ize all of the other control devices which might be appropriate, e.g., shares with extra or
no voting power, voting only shares, voting debt securities, requirements of a super major-
ity in any actions by directors and/or shareholders (including unanimous voting require-
ments) or permission for such actions to be mandated by minority approval. See generally
notes 24-35 and accompanying text supra. For a fuller discussion of control devices, see
note 38 supra.
By way of contrast, the Maryland close corporation statute is a model of unnecessary
restraints which severely limit the abilities of the owners to achieve an "incorporated
partnership." While the statute specifically legitimizes unanimous shareholder agree-
ments, MD. CORP. & ASS'N CODE ANN. §4-401 (1974), it does not invalidate agreements on
the same subject matter simply because there is not unanimous consent. Id. §4-401(e)
(providing that section 4-401 does not affect any otherwise valid agreement among stock-
holders). Because of the inherent ambiguity in section 4-401, the validity of non-
unanimous shareholder agreements must still be determined by the court. The purpose
of this provision should be to decrease litigation and to encourage shareholders to honor
their agreements. In this regard, the statute obviously fails. There are other restrictive
provisions of the Maryland statute which are equally inappropriate. Id. §4-301 (requiring
a director, although only temporary); id. §4-502 (limiting the types of securities which
close corporations can issue.)
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their consent.""' However, the partners are free to vary this rule
by agreement in any way they see fit. They may choose to provide
in the partnership agreement that any transferee or class of trans-
ferees is eligible to become a partner upon transfer of a partner-
ship interest"6 or they may elect to prohibit any assignment of the
interest."7 As in many other areas of partnership planning, the
emphasis is on permitting the parties complete freedom to choose
their associates. Since the state perceives no reason to intervene
in this aspect of a partnership, it is strange that when the part-
ners decide to incorporate, the state suddenly discovers that pub-
lic policy requires a narrowing of the owners' rights in determin-
ing the degree to which the interests in the business are to be
transferable.
Many years ago Mr. Justice Holmes observed "[t]here seems
to be no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's
associates in a corporation than in a firm.""' However, an abso-
lute prohibition in a bylaw or article"9 on transfer of the interests
of a close corporation without approval by some group of share-
holders or the corporation is invalid in Illinois. 2 ° On the other
115. In re Decker, 295 F. Supp. 501, 509 (W.D.Va. 1969). See also UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
Acr §18(g).
116. Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App.2d 229, 204 N.E. 2d 807, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903
(1965).
117. Chaiken v. Employment Sec. Comm., 274 A.2d 707 (Del. Ch. 1971). Assignment
contrary to such a provision by operation of law or otherwise would be a breach of the
partnership agreement and dissolve the partnership. The remaining partners who would
lose the managerial services which the assigning partner had to offer could not be forced
to accept the services of the assignee. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §31(2); Chatten v. Mar-
tell, 166 Cal. App.2d 545, 333 P.2d 364 (1958); Johnson v. Munsell, 170 Neb. 749, 104 N.W.
2d 314 (1960); Rosenstein v. Weiser, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Assignment by
operation of law in the context of the death or bankruptcy of a partner automatically
dissolves the partnership. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §31(4)-(5).
118. Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902).
119. Although restrictions on transfer imposed by the corporation commonly appear in
bylaws, presumably for the sake of privacy, such restrictions may appear in the articles
as well. 1935 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 846. Compare IBCA §47.12 with ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT §54(h) (1969). See also Bradley, supra note 63, at 165; Clark, Charter or By-
Law Amendment to Remove or Impose Stock Transfer Restrictions, 2 CORP. PRAC. COM.
1 (1960).
120. McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 Ill. 427, 45 N.E. 954 (1897); People ex rel. Malcom
v. Lake Sand Corp., 251 Ill. App. 499 (1st Dist. 1929); Finch v. Macoupin Tel. & Tel. Co.,
146 Ill. App. 158 (3d Dist. 1908). Such a prohibition contained in a shareholders' agree-
ment might be enforceable against any shareholder who signed it, although that result is
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hand, a bylaw (or presumably a shareholders' agreement) which
provides a restriction on the transfer of shares which is "not con-
trary to any positive rule of law or public policy, and provided the
same were were not unreasonable,"'' would be upheld. The
vagueness of this standard has promoted disputes and resulted in
the collapse of many close corporations.
Absolute power in some person or entity to block tranfer of
stock offends public policy;'22 whereas traditional buy-sell agree-
ments, giving the corporation or certain of its shareholders abso-
lute rights of first refusal do not. 3 Between these two extremes,
there is no bright line which will enable a draftsman to determine
which restrictions on alienability will be permissible.'24 For ex-
ample, a price term in a buy-sell agreement, or a first refusal
option or similar device, 25 be it based on par, or book, or fixed
price has been generally upheld by the Illinois courts, regardless
of the "fairness" of the price fixed by the bylaw or agreement at
the time of actual sale.2 6 However, that is not to say that all such
far from certain. 1 IBCA ANN. 171 (3d ed. 1975). Cf. Vogel v. Melish, 31 111. 2d 620, 203
N.E. 2d 411 (1964).
121. People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Il. App. 414, 418 (1st Dist. 1924). Cf.
Clayton v. Clow & Sons, 327 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1964).
122. See cases cited in note 120, supra.
123. Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Corp., 352 Ill. 527, 185 N.E. 822 (1933); Estate of
Brown, 130 Ill. App.2d 514, 264 N.E. 2d 287 (2d Dist. 1970); Gifford v. Rich, 58 Ill. App.2d
405, 208 N.E. 2d 47 (1st Dist. 1965); People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414
(1st Dist. 1924); Douglas v. Aurora Daily News Co., 160 I1. App. 506 (2d Dist. 1911).
124. Section 8-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code, provides, "Unless noted conspicu-
ously on the security a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer even though otherwise
lawful is ineffective except against a person with actual knowledge of it." This does
nothing to alleviate the problem confronting the draftsman in deciding the validity of any
contemplated restriction on transfer be it in the bylaws or shareholders' agreement, for
two reasons. First, it only applies to restrictions "otherwise lawful"; it does not alter
decisions such as Lake Sand Corp., see note 120, supra, recognizing "free alienability as
an inherent attribute of securities" and condemning "unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §8-204, Comment 2. Second, the section only applies
to restraints imposed by issurers, e.g., article or bylaw restrictions, and does not deal with
private agreements among shareholders. Id., at Comment 4. See generally C. ISRAELS &
L. GUTrMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS 58 (1971).
125. For a discussion of the types of restrictions on transfers of shares available to
planners of close corporations in order to insure delectus personae where possible, under
existing statutory and judicial restraints see O'Neal, supra note 38, at 187. But see Cary,
supra note 38, at 437. "Suffice it to say that there is no method of preventing the intrusion
of outsiders as effective as the dissolution of a partnership."
126. See, e.g., Estate of Brown, 130 Ill. App.2d 514, 519-20, 264 N.E. 2d 287, 290-91 (2d
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provisions would be upheld. It is obvious that one cent per share
is tantamount to an absolute restriction on transfer of shares;'2
however it is unclear how low a price must be in order for a court
to reach this determination.'28
Dist. 1970) (court enforced a first option bylaw, despite a substantial disparity between
the option price and fair market value).
The Illinois courts have consistently held that where a contract has been fairly
entered into in good faith, and without fraud, concealment or overreaching, it
may be specifically enforced in spite of a subsequent change in circumstan-
ces ....
In the instant case, there is no allegation or showing that the Stock Purchase
Agreement was procured through fraud, unfairness or overreaching, or that it
was somehow unfair at the time it was executed ...
Certainly the parties contemplated that the value of the Companies might
change from time to time, and that book value could become an unrealistic
yardstick ...
127. Cf. B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, 490 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1974); Palmer
v. Chamberlain, 191 F.2d 532, 541 (5th Cir. 1951); New England Trust v. Abbott, 162
Mass. 148, 155, 38 N.E. 432, 434 (1894); 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §7.06, at 18. See also
Systematics Inc. v. Mitchell, 253 Ark. 848, 491 S.W. 2d 40 (1973), refusing to enforce an
agreement which would have required an employee to offer his stock to the corporation
upon termination at a price of ten cents per share, when at the time of termination (for
cause) the fair market value of the stock was fifty cents per share. The court relied on the
prior Arkansas §64-211, No. 576, §26, [1965] Ark. Acts 2094 (amended 1973) which then
validated transfer restrictions which "require a prior offering to the corporation or to one
or more of its shareholders at a fair price. .. " (emphasis added). The case is indicative
of the traps which legislative use of words like "fair" or "reasonable" lay for close corpo-
rate planners when unhappy parties subsequently seek judicial relief from their own
agreements. The Arkansas legislature recognized the folly of such provisions in the close
corporation context when it amended section 64-211 in 1973 to provide that "[any price,
or formula for determining the price, set by said agreement or contract shall be deemed
to be a fair price." ARK. STAT. ANN. §64-211 (Supp. 1973).
128. There is a wide variety of methods for fixing the price terms, some of which, such
as book value, may vary greatly in dollar amount depending on the financial condition of
the business at the moment of the proposed transfer. See generally Bradley, supra note
68, at 156-60; 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §§7.24-.24(6). As a result the price fixed by
agreement may approach or be zero and effectively preclude any transfer as where the
price fixed is "book value" and the corporation has a negative net worth. In such circum-
stances, one could easily envision a court raising the cry of unreasonable restraint on free
alienability to invalidate the bargain of the parties, and to force a new associate on the
partners. However, it is worthy of note that one Illinios court, when confronted with such
a problem, did decline to free the selling shareholder from his improvident contract and
did require him to sell the stock for nominal consideration of $100 when it had no book
value. Arensten v. Sherman Towel Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933).
Although drafting and planning of such restrictions is outside the context of this Article,
it should be noted in passing that an agreement giving only the corporation, as opposed
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Thus, in a close corporation statute any restriction on transfer
embodied in the articles, bylaws, or agreement among any num-
ber of shareholders should be valid.' There should be no limita-
tion to "reasonable" restrictions; and what is reasonable is a
question for the parties to answer by planning, not the courts to
resolve by hindsight.3 0 It should also provide that all such arti-
cles, bylaws and shareholders' agreements are specifically en-
forceable at the behest of the corporation or any shareholder, but
not necessarily at the behest of some other party in interest who
relied thereon.'13
to the corporation or its designee, an option to repurchase may not be capable of exercise
at all times. If the option becomes operative at a time when the corporation is suffering
financial difficulties, the legally valid contract right to repurchase may be unperformable
by the corporation as a matter of law because of the surplus and solvency requirements
of IBCA §6. Estate of Brown, 130 11. App.2d 514, 264 N.E. 2d 287 (2d Dist. 1970); 1935
Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 846.
129. The Proposed Act seems to validate any "lawful" restriction on transfer in addition
to those enumerated if such restriction is contained in the articles, PROPOSED ACT §3, or
in a written agreement signed by all shareholders, id. §11(a) (4). The Proposed Act in
§3(a)(2), overrules McNalta and its progeny, see note 120 supra, and in addition permits
absolute restriction on transfer to avoid loss of subchapter S status, id. §3(a)(4). However,
it is not clear why the restriction must appear in the articles or shareholders' agreement
as opposed to the bylaws. Nor is it clear why a shareholders' agreement restricting transfer
must be entered into by all, rather than some, shareholders. While it is obvious that an
agreement (rather than article or bylaw) restricting transfer in some fashion would not
be enforceable against a shareholder not a party thereto, the statute should make it clear
that such agreement is enforceable against all parties thereto. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §202(b) (1974).
130. Words like "fair," "lawful," "unreasonably" leave the parties' plans to the vagar-
ies of a court's review at some undefinable future date when circumstances may have
changed drastically. Change is a risk all parties should consider in planning. Having
presumably done so, one party should not be able to avoid that risk by contending that
the contract is "unreasonable." See Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185
N.E. 822 (1933). See note 127, supra for the disastrous Arkansas experience with the
"fairness" standard. The Arkansas legislature, in removing the "fairness" standard took
pains to observe the "substantial confusion and uncertainty" which such words had
caused. ARK. STAT. ANN. §64-211.1 (Supp. 1973) citing Section 5 of Acts 1973, No. 409.
The Proposed Act should also be changed to remove these vague terms in the context of
stock transfer restrictions. PROPOSED ACT §§10, 3(a)(3). If the "reasonable" test is to
remain, then section 10(a) of the Proposed Act should be changed to afford the opportun-
ity to repurchase the shares to the corporation or its designee. See note 128, supra.
131. For example, an officer whose future employment is threatened by a change in
ownership contrary to an existing shareholders' agreement to which he is not a party
should not be able to specifically enforce the stock transfer agreement. On the other hand,
he should be able to specifically enforce any employment agreement to which he is a party.
See note 106, supra. The availability of specific enforcement is crucial to the viability of
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While the state might have some perceived interest in main-
taining free alienability as an inherent feature of securities to
insure orderly functioning of capital markets, and protection of
outside public security holders, it has no such identifiable inter-
est in the context of the close corporation. Creditors are not af-
fected by "unreasonable" transfer restrictions. The definition of
close corporation precludes the existence of markets for such se-
curities, so there is no marketplace to be disrupted by restrictions
which the state considers "unreasonable." The only interest the
state might have in interfering on behalf of present and future
shareholders is to protect them from fraud or overreaching. This
protection can be amply afforded by premising validity on the
transmittal of prior notice to the shareholder who is to be bound
thereby, whether the restriction is imposed on issue or subse-
quently by amendment."2 Thus, the notice concept of section 8-
204 of the Uniform Commercial Code'33 should be expanded to
include not only transfer restrictions imposed by the issuer but
those imposed by shareholders' agreement as well.'34 A require-
ment of conspicuous notation of the transfer restriction on the
shares should be sufficient to obviate the possibility of fraud or
overreaching.
any control device in a close corporation and should be the preferred solution. See note
111, supra; MD. CORP. & Ass'N CODE ANN. §4-401(d) (1975). However, it is probably not a
good idea to require specific enforcement in all instances since the dissatisfaction gener-
ated by the dispute may doom the essential working relation of the "partner" shareholders
and suggest dissolution as a preferable alternative. See Chayes, supra note 45, at 1532.
132. To complete the partnership analogy, any restriction on transfer to be imposed on
issued and outstanding shares by article or bylaw amendment should require unanimous
consent of all shareholders to be affected thereby. See PROPOSED ACT §5. If unanimous
consent is not obtainable, those shareholders who wish can at least bind the consenters
by shareholders' agreement, provided the Proposed Act is changed as discussed in note
129, supra. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §202 (b) (1974).
133. A restriction imposed by the charter or bylaws should be noted conspicuously on
the face of the certificate, IBCA §21; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §8-204. Different consid-
erations apply to restrictions imposed by shareholder agreement. Such agreements should
be in writing, id. §8-319(a). Cf. Smith v. Doctors Serv. Bureau, Inc., 49 Ill. App.2d 243,
199 N.E.2d 831 (1st Dist. 1964). As to their enforcebility, see note 120, supra.
134. See PROPOSED AcT §8. See also MD. CORP. & Ass'N CODE ANN. §4.401(c) (1975).
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IV. TERMINATION OF STATUS, DISSENSION AND DEADLOCK
Termination of Status
A comprehensive close corporation statute must also take into
consideration the ramifications which will occur when a close
corporation no longer meets its statutory definition. It must pro-
vide: (1) a means to remedy the disqualifying event and (2) an
opportunity for the business entity to meet the requirements of
the IBCA. While the Proposed Act contains elaborate provisions
which are designed to govern involuntary termination,'35 the lan-
guage is unclear and the procedure is incomplete. The Proposed
Act should be altered to clarify the consequences of involuntary
loss of status and to outline the course to be followed thereafter.
Under the Proposed Act, any event which breaches a qualifying
requirement with respect to restrictions on transfer or public dis-
tribution could cause the close corporation to be disqualified from
special statutory treatment.'36 A "breach" seems to be defined as
a transfer of shares contrary to one of the several restrictions on
transfer contained in the articles.'37 Since only one qualifying
restriction is needed for qualification, it is not clear why a breach
of one restriction where several were included in the corporate
arrangements and the others remain unbreached should cause a
loss of status. A breach of one of several conditions is a matter of
shareholder, not state concern. The state should only become
involved when all qualifying restrictions on transfer are breached.
Futhermore, if the suggestion of this Article with respect to public
distribution is adopted a loss of status should als6 occur if these
provisions are breached.
Prompt notice must be given to the shareholders of any event
which creates a threat of loss of status as a close corporation.' 38
The corporation or shareholder is given ninety days from the time
of notice of the disqualifying event, or if notice to all the share-
holders is not given, one year from discovery "by the corporation,
or a shareholder thereof, of said breach, ' ' 31 in order to take advan-
135. See generally PROPOSED AcT §9.
136. Id. §9(a).





tage of the broad equitable relief available under the statute to
prevent a loss of status or obtain a restoration thereof. 4" However
the provision for a one year period after discovery by a share-
holder is confusing. Does it include discovery by the transferee or
the transferor who caused the breach? And by including discovery
by the corporation, which will occur as soon as the transferee
seeks to record the transfer on the books, the inevitable activation
of the running of the one year period to the detriment of innocent,
non-breaching shareholders is occasioned. The Proposed Act
should be amended to continue the requirement that the corpora-
tion give immediate notice, but to make the statute of limitations
ninety days after notice to the other shareholders or discovery by
the other shareholders of the improper transfer.
When a shareholder of the corporation does not act within the
statutory time period, the Act simply provides that, "the corpora-
tion's status as a close corporation under this Act shall termi-
nate."'' The practical repercussions are far from clear. The Pro-
posed Act does not indicate whether the corporation's certificate
is automatically revoked, or whether further action is necessary
by the state to obtain revocation of the charter. The latter course
is probably what was intended by the Act, although the requisite
action is not described.'42 Despite the involuntary termination of
status, the corporation should retain its certificate and remain de
jure against all the world except the state.' The impact of the
alternative reading would be to impose unlimited personal liabil-
ity on the shareholders,' a penalty which seems contrary to the
purpose of the statute intended to simplify the problems con-
fronting close corporations and their owners.
Assuming that the corporation which has lost its status invol-
untarily is de jure against all except the state, the problem facing
140. Id. §9(b).
141. Id.
142. IBCA §82. Section 6(b) of the Proposed Act merely repeats that the effect of a
breach of a qualifying condition results in the loss of status, but does not indicate the
consequences of such involuntary termination.
143. IBCA §49.
144. Id. §146. See also Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1964). De facto
corporation doctrine would not likely be available to protect the shareholders from
personal liability since one of the elements of that doctrine, good faith attempt to comply




the former close corporation is how to again achieve full corporate
status under the IBCA. The area of principal difficulty will be in
management. Whereas a qualified close corporation could be run
by shareholders without a board of directors under the Proposed
Act,'45 all other Illinois business corporations must have a board
of directors."'4 Therefore, the close corporation whose status has
been involuntarily terminated will have to be afforded a transi-
tional period to remedy any defect under the IBCA. A means
should be provided for other shareholders to compel a cure of
managerial and other defects which prevent the former close cor-
poration from complete compliance with the requirements for
qualification under the IBCA. 147 In addition, the Proposed Act
should also be changed to require the corporation which has in-
voluntarily lost its status to notify the state in order that the
state might pursue quo warranto proceedings if appropriate. The
Act presently provides for such notice only in the event of volun-
tary termination of status.'
Dissension and Deadlock
Dissension and deadlock in the management of the affairs of a
close corporation have long been associated with litigation and
judicial dissolution of the business. Internal feuding and disagree-
ment which paralyze the business are harbingers of inevitable
dissolution since no other solution is possible under the IBCA.
The only resolution of a dispute between the owners should not
be a protracted court proceeding followed by liquidation of the
corporation. Some less drastic alternatives should be available.
The owners of a close corporation should be able to include in
their business plan adequate provisions for the expedient resolu-
tion of internal squabbles. The state, which has an interest in
avoiding economic loss, litigation,'49 and unnecessary liquidation
145. Proposed Act §12.
146. IBCA §33.
147. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §7-1.1-51(d) (1969); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.30-1(I)(3) (Supp. 1975); Bateman & Dawson, supra note 73, at 982.
148. Proposed Act §6.
149. See Levant v. Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 244, 86 N.W. 2d 336, 342-43 (1957): ".
[Dlissension rarely, if ever, stands alone. It is usually accompanied by circumstances of
financial loss, corporate paralysis, mismanagement and deterioration of property. . ....
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should provide means to assist the parties in resolving their inter-
nal problems with an eye towards preserving the business as a
viable entity.
It should be noted that deadlock, and dissolution are problems
indigenous to the close corporation. 150 While a large public busi-
ness may endure brief periods of internal dissension, it is rare that
the board of directors or shareholders will be deadlocked for any
prolonged period of time. In addition, any dissatisfied share-
holder in a public corporation may sell his shares in the market,
an option not available to the owner of a close corporation whose
right to sell is severely restricted. 5 ' In the case of a partnership,
any partner has the power to end a dispute by dissolving the firm
at any time, despite a contrary provision in the partnership agree-
ment.'52 The dissatisfied partner can thereby force the other par-
ties to the dispute to buy out his interest'53 and terminate the
partnership relation.'54
However, the very nature of the close corporation and the con-
trol devices used by the partner-managers, e.g., high quorum
requirements, unanimous vote requirements and other veto de-
vices'55 have a tendency to encourage dissension and deadlock.
The mere existence of an even number of directors poses an omi-
nous and continuous threat of paralysis to the business.'56 Under
the control arrangements prevalent among most close corpora-
tions, a shareholder or a director who has been given a veto power
is able to "embalm his corporation and hold it helpless . . . in a
150. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §9.02, at 3-4.
151. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text supra.
152. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr §31(2).
153. The value of his interest is decreased by any damages caused by the withdrawal
and resulting breach of the partnership agreement.
154. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 65, at 426-30. Resolution of disputes and
deadlocks in the partnership context, however, are often expensive and time consuming
and result in substantial losses to the withdrawing partner. See also Chayes, supra note
45, at 1546 n.50.
Indeed, the partnership itself is not as fragile as is sometimes assumed. True, a
partner can always withdraw. But monetary penalties can be embodied in the
partnership agreement which exert a powerful suasion for the partners to patch
up their difficulties. Similar techniques might well be employed by close-
corporation planners.
155. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §9.02, at 168 n.6.
156. See, e.g., Sterling Indus. Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 491, 84 N.E.
2d 790, 793 (1949).
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state of suspended animation."'57
Under the IBCA the dissatisfied shareholder in a close corpora-
tion is in a dilemma when dissension or deadlock arise. He cannot
solve the problem by selling his shares, nor can he singlehandedly
cause the dissolution of the corporation. Instead the IBCA pro-
vides for voluntary dissolution upon a vote of at least two-thirds
of the shares entitled to vote thereon.' A provision in the articles
which purports to give any shareholder the power to unilaterally
dissolve the corporation is probably illegal. 59 The sole remedy
afforded the unhappy partner-shareholder by the statute is to
seek judicial liquidation. 160
It is true that the potential paralytic effect of a dispute can be
obviated to a large extent by simple or intricate control devices
to resolve dissension or deadlock. A detailed analysis of such
devices is outside of the scope of this paper,"' but among the more
common are buy-sell agreements, arbitration agreements, and
contingent voting agreements.6 2
157. Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 335-36, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896-97 (1944).
158. IBCA §76.
159. Id. §146 permits the articles to require a greater vote than that required by the
statute on any matter. It does not authorize the articles of a close corporation to require
a lesser vote than that required by the statute. See also id. §31; Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga.
625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908). Cf. Moss v. Waytz, 4 Ill. App.2d 296, 124 N.E. 91 (1st Dist. 1955);
Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Ill. App. 343 (1st Dist. 1926). There is no similar constraint on
a partnership with respect to any matter, and there should not be such contraint on the
members of a close corporation in ordering their internal affairs.
160. IBCA §86(a) gives a shareholder the right to seek liquidation when it appears:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate
affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock and that irrepara-
ble injury to the corporation is suffered or threatened by reason thereof; or (2)
That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed, for a
period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect
successors to directors whose term has expired or would have expired upon the
election of their successors; or (3) That the acts of the directors or those in
control of the corporation are, illegal, oppresive or fraudulent, or (4) That the
corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
161. See generally 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, §9.04-.25; O'Neal, supra note 38, at 192-
99; Note, Deadlock and Dissolution: Problems in the Closely Held Corporation in Illinois,
56 Nw. U. L. REV. 525, 534-37 (1961).
162. Agreements to arbitrate future disputes are clearly enforceable in Illinois, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 10, §101 (1973), although an agreement to arbitrate disputes among directors
as opposed to shareholders might well run afoul of restrictions on the erosion of directors
discretion. H. HENN, supra note 103, §277, at 546. In Delaware the election of a director
by an additional class of shares created solely for the purpose of breaking the tie where
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Predetermined methods for resolving disputes should be given
effect if the result would be a solution to the problem. Several
control devices are validated by the Proposed Act' 3 if approved
by unanimous shareholder agreement.' 4 It is not clear why the
requirement of unanimity is necessary.'65 Any type of dispute
resolution agreement among any number of shareholders should
be valid as long as it does not work fraud upon the other share-
holders. 6' In addition, the Proposed Act provides the parties, and
if necessary the court, with an effective and flexible system for
resolving disputes and breaking deadlocks in unforeseen circum-
stances. The Proposed Act specifically legitimizes a provision in
the articles or bylaws which grants to one or more shareholders
the unfettered option to dissolve the corporation.' 7 The real im-
port of this provision should arise in the context of dispute rather
than deadlock. Under present law, the dissatisfied shareholder
frustrated by legal or economic transfer restrictions and seeking
dissolution, in the absence of deadlock, must prove to the court
that the conduct of his co-owners, if not fraudulent or illegal, is
"oppressive."'6 8 Thus, the bargaining strength of the vetoless
the directors elected by the other class or classes are deadlocked, is valid. Lehrman v.
Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A. 2d 800 (1966). This device, conditioning voting power on
the existence of a deadlock, would run afoul of Illinois' archaic mandatory voting provi-
sions. IBCA §§14, 28. The Proposed Act should be changed to eliminate the Illinois
requirement that all shares have full voting rights in close corporations in order to permit
use of such devices.
163. See generally PROPOSED ACT §11.
164. Id. §11(a).
165. Section 11(a)(5) of the Proposed Act provides that unanimous voting requirements
can be changed; however, this change in itself requires unanimous shareholder agreement.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether this section can be used to reduce the vote required
on any given matter, as opposed to increase it. See note 159, supra.
166. See Symposium - The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345, 381 (1957). The
state's only interest is to break the logjam.
167. Compare PROPOSED AT §13 with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §355 (1974). The Proposed
Act makes one substantive change in the Delaware Act. The latter requires the grant of
such power to a shareholder to be approved by unanimous vote unless the articles provide
that such power may be granted upon a vote of two-thirds of all shareholders. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §355(b) (1974). The Proposed Act seems to require a unanimous vote in all
cases. PROPOSED ACT §13(b). But see note 159, supra.
168. IBCA §86(a)(3). Just what conduct is "oppressive" is far from clear. The statute
offers little help other than the necessary implication that it is something more than
fraudulent or illegal conduct. Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 556, 141
N.E. 2d 45 (1957); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Il. App.3d 488, 285 N.E.
2d 574 (1st Dist. 1972). Contrast this to S.C. CODE ANN. §12-22.15(a) (4) (Supp. 1974)
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shareholder who is unhappy with the policies of a majority of his
fellow owners is far from strong. In fact, if the co-owners' activi-
ties are not "oppressive," and if normal close corporation stock
transfer restrictions are in existence, the dissatisfied shareholder
might be faced with a choice of accepting the policies of his "part-
ners" or selling to them at bargain prices: a situation of which the
other shareholders will be well aware in deciding whether to alter
corporate policy to accord with the views of the dissenting col-
league. On the other hand, if the dissenter has been granted an
enforceable unfettered option to dissolve the corporation by the
articles, the mere existence of such ominous power will be a cru-
cial factor in helping the others see the wisdom of a negotiated
sale or settlement.
The Proposed Act also gives the parties an important alterna-
tive remedy to dissolution in the case of disputes and deadlock
which are presented to a court for resolution. While the court may
still order dissolution,' the shareholders, other than those
who petitioned the court for dissolution, are entitled to avert the
court-ordered liquidation by offering to purchase the dissident's
("oppressive or unfairly prejudicial either to the corporation or to any shareholder whether
in his capacity as a shareholder, director, or officer of the corporation"). The word oppres-
sive as used in the IBCA does not
carry an essential inference of imminent disaster, but can contemplate a con-
tinuing course of conduct. The word does not necessarily savor of fraud, and
even the absence of mismanagement or misapplication of assets does not pre-
vent a finding that the conduct of the dominant director or officer has been
"oppressive".... [Elvidence in the record showing an arbitrary, overbearing
and heavy-handed course of conduct . . . [will] justify the finding of oppres-
sion, ...
Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., supra, at 499, 285 N.E. 2d at 581. Thus "oppres-
sive" is incapable of definition and "actions which might be oppressive under one set of
circumstances would not be oppressive under others." Gray v. Hall, 10 Ill. App.3d 1030,
1034, 295 N.E. 2d 506, 509 (1st Dist. 1973). It would be more beneficial if the shareholders
could make their own provisions for the effective resolution of disputes and dissension
rather than having a court determine what is "oppressive". See generally Note, supra note
161.
While the Proposed Act permits involuntary dissolution based on dissension and dead-
lock, PROPOSED ACT §14, "oppressive" conduct would still presumably be a ground for
court ordered dissolution since IBCA §86 is not clearly in conflict with section 14 of the
Proposed Act and thus supplements it. PROPOSED ACT §§2(b), 15. The IBCA should be
amended to remove the vague standard, such as "oppressive" conduct as a grounds for
corporate dissolution. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §1115 (1) (D) (1974)
(eliminating word "oppressive" and using the words "illegal" and "fraudulent").
169. PROPOSED ACT §14 (a).
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shares at court determined fair value.'70 This seems to parti-
ally codify existing case law which permits a court of equity to
use its discretion and to give the parties a period of time to
negotiate a sale or settlement before ordering liquidation.7
However, the Proposed Act makes important changes in the
case law by giving the defendant shareholders an absolute right
to purchase the shares of the plantiff, and by requiring the court
to fix a fair value in the absence of an agreement between the
parties as to value.' This remedy, however, is limited to the
situation where a shareholder without a contractual right to re-
quire dissolution at will or on the happening of a contingency, has
sought involuntary dissolution pursuant to a court order. Yet,
there seems to be no reason why the same right should not be
afforded to the other shareholders in the situation where there is
such a contractual right and it has been exercised. In these cir-
cumstances, the court should have the express power to convert
an unfettered option to dissolve into a buy-sell if it appears to be
in the best interests of all those affected.7 3 The other shareholders
170. Id. §14 (b).
171. E.g., Ward v. Colcord, 110 Ill. App.2d 68, 249 N.E. 2d 137 (1st Dist. 1969). See
also Duval v. Severson, 15 Ill. App.3d 634, 304 N.E.2d 747 (lst Dist. 1973) for another
example of judicial remedy fashioning in the context of a dispute among close corporation
shareholders.
172. PROPOSED ACT §14 (b). This provision affording some or any other shareholders the
option to purchase the dissident's shares in lieu of judicially ordered dissolution is com-
mon in states which do not have a close corporation statute. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § §4658-
59 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-384 (1960); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1825(2)
(d) (1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §1123(3) (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-125.1
(1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §7-1.1-90.1 (1969); N.J. REV. STAT. §14A: 12-7 (Supp. 1975);
S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §22.23(a) (Supp. 1974); W.VA. CODE ANN. §31-1-134 (Supp. 1974).
See also ENGLISH COMPANIES Acr, 1948, 11 & 12 GEO. 6., c.38, §210.
The California and West Virginia Code limit the right to majority shareholders. New
Jersey affords the right to majority shareholders or the corporation. The Michigan Act
permits the court to order the corporation or "the officers, directors, or other shareholders,
responsible for the wrongful acts" to purchase the dissenter's shares at fair value. The
English Companies Act empowers the court not only order the purchase 'of shares of the
complaining shareholders, but authorizes it to "make such orders as it thinks fit ... for
regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in the future." Maine, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Michigan follow the English Model and give the court wide latitude
in framing alternatives to involuntary dissolution in cases of dissension and deadlock.
173. In making its decision whether to allow the dissolution of the corporation or
whether to require a buy-out, the court should consider the interests of the employees,
creditors and the other shareholders. In any case, the dissolving shareholder will still
receive assets in the same amount and the same kind as if the option been left unchanged;
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would then have the opportunity to purchase the shares of the
"dissolving" shareholder at fair" value, and to enlist the aid of the
court, if necessary, in determining the value.'74 Such a provision
for an additional remedy in the contractual context would not
limit the freedom of the parties to order their internal affairs as
they see fit. The parties could still permit each other to act arbi-
trarily and the courts should still uphold the validity of such
agreements. However, even if the corporation were in fact liqui-
dated, all the dissenter would receive would be fair value. He
should not be afforded the absolute right to dissolve the corpora-
tion at the cost of jobs and productivity for the sole purpose of
satisfying vindictive instincts.
Surprisingly, and unfortunately, the Proposed Act omits sev-
eral common statutory devices for resolving deadlock in the close
corporation. One such device is the judicial appointment of a
provisional director, an alternative which has been adopted by a
number of states with'75 and without 7 ' close corporation statutes.
It affords "a unique dispute settling arrangement with character-
istics akin to those of compulsory arbitration, mediation, and
conciliation."' 77 Although the statutes vary somewhat as to spe-
cific provision, the Delaware model is typical. It permits the ap-
pointment of a provisional director, notwithstanding a contrary
bylaw, article, or agreement.' The provisional director is ap-
pointed at the behest of either one-half the directors, one-third
of the voting shares, or two-thirds of the shares of any class enti-
i.e. the fair value of his shares in cash.
174. The Maryland provision, MD. CORP. & Ass'N CODE ANN. §4-603 (1975), on which
section 14(b) of the Proposed Act is based, does not appear to be so limited. Cf. Bradley,
A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes,
1968 DUKE L.J. 525, 542-49 (1968). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §7-1.1-90.1 (1969). The
courts have long been brought into the bargaining process between the parties for the sole
purpose of ascertaining the fair value of stock in the context of what amounts to a forced
sale. See, e.g., IBCA §§70, 73.
175. E.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §353 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, §7213 (Supp.
1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1384 (Supp. 1975); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.30-4 (Supp.
1975).
176. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §819 (West 1955); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §22-703 (a) (1970);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §1123 (3)(e) (1974); N.J. REV. STAT. §14A: 12-7(2) (Supp.
1975).
177. 2 F. O'NAL, supra note 11, §9.30, at 121. See also Note, The Court Appointed
Provisional Director for Deadlocked Corporations, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1974).
178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §353(a) (1974).
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tled to elect a director, with a majority of shares or two-thirds of
the class which sought the appointment being empowered to re-
move him by vote.' 9 The appointee must be impartial and not
be a creditor or stockholder. Compensation and tenure are subject
to court order or agreement unless, of course, the deadlock is
broken and he is voted out. Once appointed, the provisional
director has all the powers, including voting powers, of an elected
director.
The concept of the availability of a court appointed provisional
director as provided for in the Delaware Act is a good one and
should be included in the Proposed Act. However, several impor-
tant changes should be made in the Delaware model. First of all,
the appointment should be left to the court to make sua sponte
or at the behest of any interested party. 0 The suggestion that the
result of the availablity of the appointment of a provisional direc-
tor "will very probably be to make dissolution an almost inacces-
sible remedy"'"' is founded on an assumption that the courts will
apply the remedy indiscriminately, without considering the best
interests of the corporation.' 2 One can assume that a court will
not opt for a provisional director in lieu of dissolution in the face
of a record which indicates that the owners' differences have occa-
sioned such bitter feelings that they are no longer able to work
together. However, the court should be empowered to appoint a
sufficient number of provisional directors to break the deadlock
if the articles or bylaws require more than bare majority vote for
directors' action.' 3 Furthermore, if the owners of the close corpo-
179. Id. at §353(b). The parties can reduce the numbers required for standing to apply
for a provisional director by article. See note 162 supra.
180. Apparently this is permitted in Delaware despite the carefully created numbers
test. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§352(b), 353(d) (1974). See also TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.30-4 (Supp. 1975).
181. Bradley, supra note 174, at 550.
182. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §352 (b) (1974).
183. New Jersey permits the appointment of "one or more provisional directors," when
such appears to be in the best interests of the corporation. N.J. REv. STAT. §14A: 12-7 (3)
(Supp. 1975). Delaware permits the appointment of "a provisional director .. .if the
directors are so divided respecting the management of the corporation's business and
affairs that the votes required for action by the board of directors cannot be ob-
tained .. " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §353(a) (1974). Whether the court could make two
or more such appointments to break a deadlock in the case where the close corporation
articles or bylaws require a super majority for action is not clear, although the statutory
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ration choose to eliminate the board of directors and provide for
shareholder management, the court should be empowered to ap-
point a provisional "shareholder" equipped with enough votes to
break a deadlock. 8 4
Another typical close corporation statutory device which the
Proposed Act omits is the authority for the court to appoint a
custodian in lieu of a receiver. 5 The role of a custodian is akin
to that of a trustee under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act;' the
custodian is to attempt to rehabilitate the business by renegotiat-
ing the relations between the parties. He is to manage the busi-
ness and preserve it for the benefit of the parties rather than
liquidating it and distributing the proceeds as a receiver would
do. Unlike a provisional director," 7 a custodian would be useful
where the parties had provided that unanimous consent of all the
directors or shareholders would be required for corporate action.
Although a successful reconciliation is unlikely,' there is much
to be gained by allowing a custodian to attempt to negotiate a
settlement.
Since the state has a legitimate interest in breaking the dead-
lock and preserving the value of a solvent close corporation if
possible, it should make available to the parties and the courts
language seems to weigh against such authority. The California statutory provision differs
from the New Jersey statute in that the former permits the appointment of a provisional
director only when there is an even number of directors who are equally divided. CAL.
CORP. CODE §819(a) (West 1955) In any case, the provisional director is useless in the
situation where the deadlock is precipitated by a unanimous voting requirement.
184. Although section 351 of the Delaware Code suggests such a result is permissible in
theory, its application is difficult to imagine. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §351 (1974).. If there
is an even number of shareholders of a single class, a shareholder with one share could
break the deadlock. But if there is more than one class of shares outstanding, and/or more
than a single vote is required to break a deadlock, which class would the provisional
shareholder manager hold and to how many votes in either or both classes would he be
entitled?
185. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §352 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §14A: 12-7 (Supp.
1975); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-94 (1973). But see Fales, Judicial Attitudes Towards the
Rights of Minority Shareholders, 22 Bus. LAW. 459, 463 (1967) (suggesting judicial author-
ity to appoint a custodial receiver exists even in the absence of statutory provision); Holi-
Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W. 2d 517 (Iowa, 1974).
186. 11 U.S.C. §§521 et seq. (1970). Cf. Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A. 2d 610 (Del.
Ch. 1974).
187. See note 183, supra.
188. If, as is likely, the custodian is incapable of remedying the deadlock and dissen-
sion, dissolution will result. See Slotsky v. Gellar, 49 Pa. D. & C. 2d 255 (C.P. Phil. Cty.
1969); 455 Pa. 148, 314 A.2d 495 (1974).
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all the remedial tools suggested above. The parties and the courts
can then determine the propriety of any device as a means of
solving their particular problem.
CONCLUSION
Some of the ideas suggested in this Article will sound like her-
esy to traditionalists at the corporate bar. The concept of an
incorporated partnership is in inherent conflict with some well-
established concepts of corporation law, such as management by
an independent board of directors and free alienability of shares.
However, this Article has avoided several very radical notions
which have been raised in the context of close corporations. For
example, it has not adopted the suggestion that the close corpora-
tion be exempt from the traditional requirement that corporate
owners make a firm commitment of a reasonable amount of capi-
tal to the business in exchange for limited liability."'
Furthermore, this Article does not incorporate the suggestion that
contributions of such intangibles as future services should be rec-
ognized as an adequate substitute for the traditional requirement
that capital contributions be in the form of cash or property. 90 It
would be unreasonable to expect the Illinois legislature to accept
either of these more controversial ideas at this time. However it
would not be unreasonable to expect the legislature to take its
place among many of the more economically progressive states by
giving legislative recognition to the fact that a close corporation
is a unique entity requiring distinct legal treatment. Although the
close corporation possesses some of the attributes of both partner-
ships and public corporations, it is unique with respect to the
nature of its legal problems and its needs. The Proposed Act, with
the changes suggested herein, would present an excellent means
for beginning to alleviate these problems and accomodate these
needs.
189. See Bradley, supra note 174, at 555.
190. Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of
a Close Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1098, 1108-11 (1962).
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APPENDIX
H.B. 1950
The following is a reproduction of the relevant portions of the proposed Illinois Close
Corporation Act.
Section 2. Law Applicable to Close Corporation. (a) Unless a corporation elects to
become a close corporation in the manner prescribed in this Act, it shall be subject to the
provisions of The Business Corporation Act.
(b) All provisions of The Business Corporation Act shall be applicable to (1) all close
corporations, as defined in Section 3 of this Act, except insofar as this Act otherwise
provides, and (2) any close corporation -that has voluntarily or involuntarily terminated
its close corporation status.
Section 3. Close Corporation Defined; Contents of Articles of Incorporation. (a) A close
corporation is a corporation organized under or electing to be subject to this Act the
articles of incorporation of which provide that all of the issued shares of each class shall
be subject to one or more of the following restrictions on transfer which restrictions shall
be uniform within each class:
(1) Obligates a shareholder to offer to the corporation or to one or more shareholders
of the corporation or to any designated person or to any combination of the foregoing, a
prior opportunity to acquire such shares; or
(2) Requires the corporation or the holders of shares of any class of the corporation to
consent to any proposed transferee of the shares; or
(3) Prohibits the transfer of such shares to designated persons or classes of persons,
and such designation is not manifestly unreasonable; or
(4) Prohibits a transfer of the shares if the transfer would cause the corporation to lose
its status as an electing small business corporation under subchapter S of the United
States Internal Revenue Code; or
(5) Imposes any other lawful restriction on transfer or registration of transfer of shares.
(b) The articles of incorporation of a close corporation may set forth the qualifications
of shareholders, either by specifying classes of persons who shall be entitled to be holders
of record of shares of any class, or by specifying classes of persons who shall not be entitled
to be holders of shares of any class, or both.
Section 5. Election of Existing Corporation to Become a Close Corporation. Any corpo-
ration organized under The Business Corporation Act may become a close corporation
under this Act by amendment of its articles of incorporation which must be approved
unanimously in writing or by the vote of the holders of record of all the outstanding shares
of each class of the corporation.
Section 6. Limitations on Continuation of Close Corporation Status. A close corpora-
tion continues to be such and to be subject to this Act until:
(a) It files with the Secretary of State articles of amendment deleting from its articles
of incorporation the provisions required by Section 3, or
(b) Any one of the provisions or conditions required or permitted by Section 3 of this
Act to be stated in articles of incorporation to qualify a corporation as a close corporation
has in fact been breached and neither the corporation nor any of its shareholders proceeds
under Section 9.
Section 7. Voluntary Termination of Close Corporation Status by Amendment of Arti-
cles of Incorporation; Vote Required. (a) A corporation may voluntarily terminate its
status as a close corporation and cease to be subject to this Act by amending its articles
of incorporation to delete therefrom the additional provisions required by Section 3. Any
such amendment must be approved in writing or by a vote of the holders of record of at
least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of the corporation.
(b) The articles of incorporation of a close corporation may provide that on any
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amendment to terminate its status as a close corporation, a unanimous vote or any vote
greater than two-thirds of the shares of any class shall be required; and, if the articles of
incorporation contains sucha provision, that provision shall not be amended, repealed or
modified by any vote less than that so required to terminate the corporation's-status as a
close corporation.
Section 8. Issuance or Transfer of Shares of a Close Corporation in Breach of Qualify-
ing Conditions. (a) Every certificate representing shares issued by a close corporation shall
conspicuously set forth upon the face or back of the certificate a full statement of all the
restrictions on transfer and the qualifications of shareholders set forth in subparagraphs
(a) and (b), respectively, of Section 3 of this Act and the existence of a written agreement
permitted under Section 11 of this Act. Such full statement may be omitted from the
certificate if it shall be conspicuously set forth upon the face or back of the certificate that
such statement and written agreement, if any, in full, will be furnished by the corporation
to any shareholder upon request and without charge.
(b) Any person to whom certificates representing shares of a close corporation contain-
ing either statement required by suparagraph (a) of this Section 8 are issued or assigned
is conclusively presumed to have notice (i) of the fact of his ineligibility to be a share-
holder, (ii) that he has acquired shares in violation of a restriction on transfer allowed
pursuant to this Act, and (iii) of the provisions of a written agreement permitted under
Section 11 of this Act.
Section 9. Involuntary Termination of Close Corporation Status; Proceeding to Pre-
vent Loss of Status. (a) If any event occurs as a result of which one or more of the
provisions or conditions included in the articles of incorporation of a close corporation
pursuant to Section 3 hereof to qualify it as a close corporation has been breached, then
upon discovery by the corporation of such event, the corporation shall promptly notify all
of the shareholders in writing of such event and of the shareholders' rights under subpara-
graph (b) of this Section 9. If, within 90 days after such notification, the breach is not
remedied or a proceeding under subparagraph (b) of this Section 9 is not commenced, then
the corporation's status as a close corporation under this Act shall terminate. In the event
that all of the shareholders of the corporation are not so notified within one year after the
discovery by the corporation, or a shareholder thereof, of said breach, then the corpora-
tion's status as a close corporation under this Act shall terminate as of the last day of said
one year period, unless within said one year period the breach is remedied or a proceeding
is commenced under subparagraph (b) of this Section 9.
(b) The Circuit Court of the County in which the registered office of the corporation
is located, upon the suit of the corporation or any shareholder thereof, shall have jurisdic-
tion to issue all orders necessary to prevent the corporation from losing its status as a close
corporation, or to restore its status as a close corporation. The Circuit Court shall enjoin
or set aside any transfer or threatened transfer of shares of a close corporation which is
contrary to the terms of its articles of incorporation or of any transfer restriction permitted
by subparagraph (a) of Section 3 of this Act.
Section 10. Corporate Option Where a Restriction on Transfer of Shares is Held In-
valid. If a restriction on transfer of shares of a close corporation is held by the Circuit Court
in a proceeding pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Section 9 of this Act not to be authorized
by subparagraph (a) of Section 3 of this Act, the corporation shall nevertheless have an
option, for a period of 30 days after the judgment.setting aside the restriction becomes
final, to acquire the restricted shares at a price which is agreed upon by the parties, or if
no agreement is reached as to price within such 30 day period, then at the fair value of
such shares as determined by the Circuit Court.
Section 11. Written Agreements as to Conduct of Certain Affairs of Corporation. (a)
All shareholders of a close corporation may enter into a written agreement, relating to any
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phase of the affairs of the corporation, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Management of the business of the corporation.
(2) Declaration and payment of dividends or division of profits.
(3) Who shall be officers or directors, or both, of the corporation.
(4) Restrictions on transfer of shares permitted by Section 3 of this Act.
(5) Voting requirements, including the requirements of unanimous voting of share-
holders or directors.
(6) Employment of shareholders by the corporation.
(7) Arbitration of issues as to which the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power
or as to which the directors are deadlocked and the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock.
(b) No written agreement to which shareholders of a close corporation have actually
assented, whether embodied in the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation
or in any separate written agreement and which relates to any phase of the affairs of the
corporation, whether to the management of its business or division of its profits or other-
wise, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt
by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their
relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between partners.
(c) If the business of a close corporation is managed by a Board of Directors, an
agreement among all of the shareholders, whether solely among themselves or between all
of them and a party who is not a shareholder, is not invalid, as among the parties thereto,
on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the affairs of the corporation as to
interfere with the discretion of the Board of Directors, but the making of such an agree-
ment shall impose upon the shareholders the liability for managerial acts that is imposed
by the laws of this State upon directors.
Section 12. Management by Shareholders. (a) The articles of incorporation of a close
corporation may provide that the business of the corporation shall be managed by the
shareholders of the corporation rather than by a board of directors. So long as this provi-
sion continues in effect,
(1) No meeting of shareholders need be called to elect directors;
(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise the shareholders of the corporation
shall be deemed to be directors for purposes of applying provisions of The Business Corpo-
ration Act; and
(3) The shareholders of the corporation shall be subject to all liabilities of directors.
(b) Such a provision may be inserted in the articles of incorporation by amendment
if all incorporators and subscribers or shareholders of record authorize such a provision.
An amendment to the articles of incorporation to delete such provision shall be adopted
by a vote of the holders of record of a least two-thirds of all the outstanding shares of each
class of the corporation. If the articles of incorporation contain a provision authorized by
this Section 12, the existence of such provision shall be noted conspicuously on the face
or back of every certificate representing shares issued by the corporation.
Section 13. Shareholders' Option to Dissolve Corporation. (a) The articles of incorpo-
ration of any close corporation may include a provision granting to any shareholder, or to
the holders of any specified number or percentage of shares of any class, an option to have
the corporation dissolved at will or upon the occurrence of any specified event or contin-
gency. Whenever any such option to dissolve is exercised, the shareholders exercising such
option shall give written notice thereto to all other shareholders. After the expiration of
30 days following the sending of such notice, the dissolution of the corporation shall
proceed as if the required number of shareholders having voting power had consented in
writing to dissolution of the corporation.
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(b) If the articles of incorporation as originally filed do not contain a provision author-
ized by subparagraph (a) of this Section 13, the articles of incorporation may be amended
to include such provision if adopted by the affirmative vote of the holders of record of all
the outstanding shares of each class of the corporation.
(c) Every share certificate representing shares issued by a close corporation whose
articles of incorporation authorize dissolution as permitted by this Section 13 shall con-
spicuously note on the face or back thereof the existence of the provision. Unless noted
conspicuously on the face or back of the share certificate, the provision shall be ineffective.
Section 14. Judicial Dissolution. (a) The Circuit Court of the County in which the
registered office of the corporation is located may entertain a petition of any shareholder
for involuntary dissolution of any close corporation and, at the hearing, may appoint a
receiver or trustee of the corporation and order it dissolved when it is made to appear that
(1) the directors or shareholders of the corporation are deadlocked in the management
of the corporate affairs and, in the case of directors, the shareholders are unable to break
the deadlock, or that the shareholders are otherwise deadlocked; and
(2) any remedy, including arbitration, provided in any written agreement of the share-
holders upon deadlock has failed to eliminate such deadlock; and
(3) there is such internal dissension among the shareholders of the corporation that
the business and affairs can no longer be conducted in the best interests of the sharehold-
ers.
(b) Any one or more shareholders desiring to continue the business of a close corpora-
tion may avoid the dissolution of the corporation or the appointment of a trustee or
receiver under this Section 14 by electing in a written instrument filed in the proceeding
to purchase the shares of stock owned by the petitioner at a price equal to their fair value.
If a shareholder or shareholders making such election are unable to reach an agreement
with the petitioner as to the fair value of his shares within 30 days after the filing of such
election, the court shall, upon said electing shareholders giving bond or other security in
an amount fixed by the court, stay the proceeding and proceed to determine the fair value
of such shares as of the close of the business on the day on which the petition for the
dissolution was filed.
